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Abstract	
	
This	paper	reports	empirical	evidence	supporting	the	hypothesis	that	family	ties	should	be	listed	
among	 the	 causes	 of	 tax	 evasion.	 In	 societies	 where	 the	 power	 of	 the	 family	 is	 very	 high,	 the	
quality	of	 public	 institutions	 tends	 to	be	 low.	 This	 connection	 shapes	 the	behavior	of	 taxpayers	
and	 generates	 underground	 economy.	 The	 econometric	 analysis	 is	 based	 on	 linear	 panel	 data	
models,	and	a	new	dataset	that	combines	data	on	personal	values,	social	capital,	and	tax	morale,	
in	combination	with	an	index	of	the	shadow	economy.	The	final	results	show	that	countries	where	
family	ties	are	stronger	also	exhibit	higher	underground	economy.	
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People	who	do	not	trust	one	another	will	end	up	cooperating	only	under	a	system	of	formal	
rules	 and	 regulations,	 which	 have	 to	 be	 negotiated,	 agreed	 to,	 litigated,	 and	 enforced,	
sometimes	by	coercive	means.	This	legal	apparatus,	serving	as	a	substitute	for	trust,	entails	
what	economists	call	“transaction	costs.”	Widespread	distrust	 in	a	society,	 in	other	words,	
imposes	a	kind	of	tax	on	all	forms	of	economic	activity,	a	tax	that	high-trust	societies	do	not	
have	to	pay.	
	
Francis	Fukuyama,	Trust,1995.		
	
	
La	morale	del	popolo	 italiano	è	soprattutto	una	morale	familiare.	Nell’ambito	della	cerchia			
familiare,	 ogni	 membro	 aiuta	 l’altro	 con	 inconscio	 eroismo,	 accettando	 come	 un	 dovere	
anche	 il	più	grande	sacrificio.	 (…)	Ma	 la	morale	sociale	è	 rilassata.	 Ilgoverno	è	considerato	
come	qualcosa	di	estraneo	e	ostile	al	popolo.	
	
[Tax	morale	of	Italians	is	essentially	a	family	morale.	Within	the	family	range,	each	member	
helps	each	other	with	unconscious	heroism,	accepting	as	a	duty	even	 the	biggest	 sacrifice	
(…).	But	the	social	morale	is	loose.	Government	is	considered	as	something	extraneous	and	
hostile	to	the	people.]												
	
Gaetano	Salvemini,	La	mentalità	degli	Italiani,	1928.	
	
	“The	 first	 source	 of	 power	 is	 the	 family.	 (…)	 Scholars	 have	 always	 recognized	 the	 Italian	
family	 as	 the	 only	 fundamental	 institution	 in	 the	 country,	 a	 spontaneous	 creation	 of	 the	
national	genius,	adapted	through	the	centuries	to	changing	conditions,	the	real	foundation	
of	whichever	social	order	prevails.	In	fact,	the	law,	the	State	and	society	function	only	if	they	
do	not	directly	interfere	with	the	family’s	supreme	interests.”	
	
Luigi	Barzini,	The	Italians,	1964.	
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1.	Introduction	
	
This	paper	aims	 to	 study	 the	 role	played	by	 family	 ties	 in	determining	 the	 level	of	underground	
economy	 in	 a	 country.	 Political	 scientists	 and,	 more	 recently,	 economists,	 advocate	 the	
importance	 of	 family	 ties	 in	 explaining	 social	 capital,	 trust	 in	 public	 institutions,	 political	
participation,	 and	 economic	 outcomes.	 Surprisingly,	 family	 ties,	 and	 the	 role	 of	 the	 family	 in	
shaping	values,	have	not	been	adequately	considered	as	a	key	variable	of	the	size	of	underground	
economy.		
	
Over	 the	 last	 decade,	 a	 growing	 part	 of	 the	 economic	 literature	 on	 tax	 evasion	 has	 extensively	
approached	individual	decisions	to	comply	with	tax	obligations	by	exploring	the	role	of	taxpayers’	
ethics	 and	 morale,	 providing	 robust	 evidence	 that	 tax	 morale,	 citizens’	 ethics,	 and	 quality	 of	
institutions	 are	 important	 factors	 in	 explaining	 the	 behavior	 of	 taxpayers	 and	 the	 size	 of	 the	
underground	economy	in	a	given	country.	
	
This	paper	contributes	to	this	literature	by	providing	empirical	evidence	of	a	positive	relationship	
between	 the	 strength	 of	 family	 ties	 and	 the	 level	 of	 the	 shadow	 economy.	 In	 particular,	 we	
construct	a	bridge	between	two	 fields	of	 literature.	First,	 the	 literature	on	 family	 ties	and	social	
capital,	which	advocates	that	the	strength	of	family	ties	are	negatively	correlated	with	the	quality	
of	 social	 capital,	 trust	 in	public	 institutions,	political	participation,	and	economic	outcomes	 (see,	
among	 the	others,	Banfield	 (1958),	Fukuyama	 (1995),	Putnam	(1993),	Bisin-Verdier	 (1998,	2000,	
2010),	Alesina-Giuliano	(2010,	2011)).	Second,	the	literature	on	tax	morale	and	tax	evasion	which	
shows	that	the	level	of	tax	evasion	is	higher	where	the	level	of	tax	morale	and	citizens’	ethics	 is	
lower	 (consider,	 for	 example,	 Torgler-Schneider	 (2006,	 2009),	 Torgler	 (2003,	 2004,	 2005,	 2006,	
2007),	Alm-Torgler	(2006),	Feld-Torgler	(2007),	Frey-Torgler	(2007),	Lago-Penas-Lago-Penas	(2010),	
Alm-Martinez-Vasquez-Torgler	(2006),	Alm-Martinez-Vasquez	(2007)).	
	
We	believe	 that	 family	 ties	 should	be	acknowledged	as	an	 important	 cause	of	 the	underground	
economy	and	 tax	evasion,	because	 they	affect	 the	degree	of	 tax	morale.	 In	 societies	where	 the	
power	of	the	family	is	very	high,	the	quality	of	public	institutions	is	low;	this	fact	strongly	affects	
the	 civic	 values	 of	 taxpayers,	 and	 therefore	 shapes	 their	 compliance	 behavior,	 generating	 an	
underground	economy.	
	
Our	empirical	strategy	is	to	use	linear	panel	data	models	to	estimate	the	relationship	between	the	
strength	of	 family	 ties	 and	 the	degree	of	 the	underground	economy.	 Therefore,	we	 construct	 a	
new	dataset	that	combines	data	on	personal	values,	social	capital,	and	tax	morale,	with	an	index	
of	the	shadow	economy.	Variables	related	to	personal	values	are	based	on	different	waves	of	the	
World	Value	Survey	and	European	ValueSurvey,	which	cover	more	than	70	countries	over	almost	
20	years,	spanning	1990	to	2010.	Data	on	the	underground	economy	are	extracted	from	Schneider	
(2005),	 Schneider	 and	 Enste	 (2000,	 2002),	 and	 Schneider-Buehn	 and	 Montenegro	 (2010).	 In	
addition,	as	a	robustness	check,	we	also	use	data	on	perceived	corruption	(CPI	index	provided	by	
Transparency	 International),	 exploiting	 the	high	 correlation	between	corruption	and	 tax	evasion	
(seeTorgler-Schneider	(2009);	Buehn-Schneider	(2012)).	
	
To	 interpret	 the	correlation	between	family	 ties	and	the	underground	economy,	 in	 terms	of	 the	
causal	 relationship,	we	also	perform	an	 instrumental	 variables	exercise,	using	 the	variables	 that	
measure	the	importance	of	the	role	of	the	mother	and	role	of	the	father	in	the	family,	which	were	
registered	in	the	1981	European	Value	Survey,	as	an	instrument	for	the	variables	used	to	measure	
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the	strength	of	 family	 ties.In	general,	 the	power	of	 the	 family	 seems	 to	depend	strongly	on	 the	
‘role	 of	 the	mother’	within	 the	 family.	 The	 different	 roles	 of	 the	 father	 and	mother	within	 any	
family	 should	 largely	 explain	 the	 ‘familial	 mentality,’	 which	 gives	 rise	 to	 weak	 collective	
responsibilities	 and	 civic	 involvements	 (see	 on	 this	 Gambino	 (1998,	 39–50),	 Simone	 (2005),	
Turiello	(1887),	Bachofen	(1949)).	
	
Our	econometric	analysis	provides	three	key	findings.	First,	we	provide	the	first	empirical	evidence	
supporting	 a	 causal	 relationship	 between	 family	 ties	 and	 the	 dimension	 of	 the	 underground	
economy	(i.e.,	where	family	ties	are	stronger,	the	degree	of	the	underground	economy	is	higher).	
Second,	 we	 provide	 empirical	 evidence	 of	 a	 negative	 relationship	 between	 family	 ties	 and	 tax	
morale.	Third,	as	a	robustness	check,	we	confirm	that	there	is	also	a	positive	relationship	between	
the	strength	of	family	ties	and	the	level	of	perceived	corruption.	
	
Our	analysis	does	not	imply	any	moral	judgment	on	family	values;	on	the	contrary,	we	are	aware	
that	family,	in	many	contexts,	is	a	crucial	positive	factor	for	economic	progress	and	good	life.	Our	
point	is	very	simple:	it	is	important	to	have	the	right	balance	between	trust	in	the	family	and	trust	
in	public	institutions.	If	people	use	mainly	the	family	to	have	a	relationship	with	their	peers,	then	
the	 degree	 of	 trust	 is	 affected,	 as	well	 as	 the	 quality	 of	 public	 institutions	 and	 participation	 in	
collective	life.	As	a	result,	one	of	the	main	policy	implications	of	our	results	is	that	the	structure	of	
society	is	one	of	the	main	factors	that	should	be	taken	into	account	when	designing	policies	with	
the	aim	of	reducing	tax	evasion.	
	
The	remainder	of	the	paper	is	organized	into	the	following	sections.	In	section	2,	we	briefly	review	
the	recent	theory	of	 tax	evasion	and	underground	economy,	and	review	the	main	results	of	 the	
published	 literature	 on	 this	 matter.	 In	 section	 3,	 we	 outline	 recent	 works	 on	 tax	 morale	 and	
evasion.	In	section	4,	we	review	models	on	the	role	of	the	family	in	transmitting	cultural	traits	and	
social	values.	In	section	5,	we	address	the	issue	of	family	ties	and	social	capital,	and	explain	why	
we	do	expect	that	the	role	of	the	family	should	be	crucial	in	explaining	the	behavior	of	taxpayers.	
In	section	6,	we	identify	and	analyze	the	main	drivers	of	family	ties;	in	particular,	we	address	the	
role	of	the	mother	in	shaping	family	ties.	The	structure	of	the	dataset	is	defined	and	described	in	
section	7.	In	section	8,	we	present	the	econometric	approach	that	we	use	to	assess	the	role	of	the	
family	and	social	capital	on	the	underground	economy	and	tax	morale,	and	we	describe	the	main	
results	obtained	from	empirical	estimates.	Finally,	in	section	9,	we	present	the	main	conclusions,	
and	potential	directions	for	further	research.	All	tables	and	figures	are	reported	in	the	Appendix.	
	
	
2.	Tax	Evasion	and	the	Underground	Economy		
	
Tax	evasion	has	been	widely	investigated	over	the	last	four	decades.	Most	analyses	focus	on	the	
pioneeristic	 approach	 of	 Allingham-Sandmo	 (1972),	 which	 look	 at	 tax	 evasion	 as	 a	 problem	 of	
portfolio	 choice;	 essentially,	 taxpayers	 will	 eventually	 decide	 to	 not	 comply	 if	 they	 estimate	 a	
possible	 monetary	 gain	 from	 cheating	 behavior.	 The	 possible	 net	 benefits	 of	 a	 taxpayer	 are	 a	
function	 of	 monetary	 gains	 that	 she	 would	 derive	 from	 tax	 saving,	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 her	
dishonest	behaviors	(tax	evasion)	and	of	monetary	sanctions,	which	the	taxpayer	will	have	to	pay,	
if	detected,	with	some	given	probability.	It	is	assumed	that	the	higher	the	expected	punishment,	
as	the	product	of	fines	and	the	probability	of	detection,	the	lower	the	level	of	tax	evasion.	
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Most	of	the	following	works	have	tried	to	enrich	the	basic	model	by	modeling	the	tax	game	that	
takes	place	between	tax	authorities	and	taxpayers	in	a	more	sophisticated	way.	Examples	include	
making	 the	 probability	 of	 detection	 endogenous,	 assuming	 different	 forms	 of	 individual	
preferences	(in	particular,	with	regard	to	risk),	or	approaching	the	tax	game	as	a	repeated	game,	
where	certain	sub-game	perfect/imperfect	(Nash)	equilibriums	are	possible.	
	
Most	explanations	stress	the	role	of	the	level	of	taxation,	as	given	by	various	indicators	(total	taxes	
as	 a	%	of	 the	GDP,	effective	 tax	 rates,	 etc.).	 Such	 indicators	 include	 the	 tax	mix	 (given	 that	 the	
various	 forms	 of	 direct	 and	 indirect	 taxes	 have	 a	 different	 possibility	 of	 being	 evaded),	 the	
efficiency	 of	 the	 public	 sector,	 the	 quality	 of	 public	 expenditure,	 the	 compliance	 costs	 and	 the	
complexity	of	tax	system,	the	tax	collection	mechanism,	and,	last	but	not	least,	tax	inspection	and	
the	 quality	 and	 structure	 of	 tax	 controls.	 The	 general	 conclusion	 is	 that	 tax	 evasion	 is	 a	 very	
complex	phenomenon,	and	 that	a	multidimensional	or	multidisciplinary	approach	 is	 required.	 In	
general,	tax	deterrence	models	do	not	always	fully	explain	the	compliance	rate	in	countries	where	
tax	 evasion	 is	 widespread,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 exceptional	 rate	 in	 other	 countries	 where	 there	 is	 a	
strong	degree	of	trust,	public	morale,	and	efficiency	of	public	institutions.	
	
Some	studies	have,	however,	 shown	that	 the	 role	of	 tax	 inspection	and	deterrence	measures	 in	
fighting	evasion	are	far	from	clear,	and	are	often	disputed:	“fines	and	tax	auditing	are	unable	to	
explain	the	actual	 level	of	tax	compliance	as	they	are	too	 low	to	provide	effective	deterrence	 in	
most	OECD	countries.”1	Other	authors	even	suggest	that	the	real	enigma	of	tax	evasion	is	not	why	
tax	fines	and	inspections	are	so	unsuccessful	 in	fighting	tax	evasion,	rather	than	why	people	pay	
taxes	honestly,	given	the	rather	low	level	of	fines,	intensity	of	controls,	and	the	low	probability	of	
being	caught2.	More	generally,	the	empirical	evidence	on	the	impact	of	tax	auditing	and	fines	on	
tax	evasion	and	the	shadow	economy	remains	ambiguous.3	
	
Theoretical	models	have	provided	many	possible	explanations	for	tax	evasion;	however,	ultimately,	
none	of	these	models	tend	to	be	fully	satisfactory.	There	is	no	single	cause	that	may	explain	such	
differences	in	tax	compliance.	The	factors	that	are	usually	considered	include:	
a)	The	level	of	tax	burden/pressure:	a	higher	tax	ratio	may	result	in	greater	tax	evasion;		
b)	The	efficiency	and	effectiveness	of	tax	administration	and,	in	general,	of	the	public	sector;	
c)	Tax	complexity:	a	costly	and	complex	tax	system	may	induce	people	not	to	comply	fully;	
d)	 The	 quality	 of	 public	 spending	 and	 public	 services	 provision	 or,	 rather,	 what	 people	 really	
perceive	in	this	respect;	
e)	Tax	composition:	higher	taxes	on	personal	and	company	incomes	should	result	in	more	evasion,	
while	property	and	consumption	taxes	may	prove	more	robust	to	tax	cheating;	
f)	The	structure	of	fines	and	sanctions	and,	in	particular,	their	credibility.	
	
All	of	these	factors	are	assumed	to	play	an	important	role	in	explaining	the	different	levels	of	tax	
evasion	 in	different	 countries.	However,	 there	 are	 some	 important	 exceptions	 and	 conundrums	
that	still	have	to	be	addressed.	First,	Sweden,	Denmark,	and,	in	general,	all	of	the	Nordic	countries	
have	very	high	 tax	pressure	but	an	astonishingly	 low	ratio	of	 tax	evasion,	according	 to	standard	
estimates.	Second,	why	do	countries	such	as	Italy,	Greece,	and	Portugal	tend	to	show	a	very	high	
ratio	 of	 tax	 evasion?	 Are	 there	 any	 other	 variables,	 apart	 from	 the	 structural	 ones,	 that	 may	
                                                
1	See,	 among	 others,	 Slemrod-Yitzhaki	 (2002),	 Torgler	 (2003),	 Braithwaite-Wenzel	 (2008),	 Feld-Schmidt-Scnheider	
(2007).	
2	See	Alm-McClelland-Schulze	(1992).	
3	Feld-	Schmidt-Schenider	(2007).	
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explain	this	gap	 in	tax	evasion	with	other	countries?	 Is	there	any	political	economy	lever	behind	
tax	evasion?	Third,	we	believe	that	cultural	attitudes	and	the	moral	dimension	are	crucial	 if	one	
wants	to	deal	with	tax	evasion,	that	tax	morale	really	matters.	The	issues	of	public	ethics	and	the	
tax	morale	of	different	people	have	not	been	adequately	considered	in	the	theoretical	approach	
to	tax	evasion.	Only	in	the	last	decade	tax	morale	has	been	placed	in	relation	to	tax	evasion,	and	
some	empirical	investigations	have	tried	to	prove	the	existence	of	some	correlation	and	causality	
between	the	two	phenomena.	However,	more	evidence	is	needed.	
	
In	this	work,	we	partially	adopt	a	different	perspective.	The	idea	of	the	paper	is	very	simple.	We	
want	to	use	some	recent	outcomes	in	political	economy	literature	and	determine	whether	these	
political	 economy	 variables	 play	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 explaining	 the	 size	 of	 the	 underground	
economy	in	a	sample	of	OECD	and	non-OECD	countries.	
	
The	study	of	tax	evasion	requires	improvement;	overall,	what	we	know	about	tax	evasion	remains	
insufficient.	In	some	countries,	tax	evasion	tends	to	be	very	persistent	and	stable,	if	not	increasing,	
notwithstanding	 strong	 tax	 detection	 policies.	 We	 are	 not	 saying	 that	 tax	 inspection	 and	 the	
deterrent	activities	 implemented	by	governments	are	not	 important	or	useful.	More	 simply,	we	
are	 saying	 that	 in	 some	 cases,	 detection	 alone	 is	 not	 sufficient	 to	 explain	 the	 underground	
economy	 and	 that,	 perhaps,	 a	 different	 approach	 may	 prove	 useful	 to	 effectively	 address	 the	
complexity	of	tax	evasion.	The	theory	of	social	capital	may	be	of	some	help	in	this	respect.	
	
	
3.	The	role	of	tax	morale		
	
Over	 the	 last	decade,	 some	papers	have	 tried	 to	assess	 the	 role	of	 tax	morale	 in	explaining	 the	
underground	 economy.	 Schneider,	 Torgler,	 and	 some	 other	 authors4	have	 estimated	 that	 tax	
morale	plays	quite	a	significant	role	in	determining	taxpayers’	behavior	and	their	decision	for	tax	
evasion.	
	
The	main	argument	is	that,	together	with	the	classic	variables	(such	as	economic	growth,	the	level	
of	education,	tax	pressure,	 the	 level	and	quality	of	public	expenditure,	 the	policy	of	prosecution	
and	 punishment),	 a	 better	 understanding	 of	 the	 shadow	 economy	 also	 requires	 to	 investigate	
variables,	such	as	“subjective	perception,	expectations,	attitudes	and	motivations,	 tax	morale	or	
perceived	institutional	quality.”5	Even	if	the	main	structural	factors	remain	fundamental,	data	and	
some	recent	models	indicate	that	it	is	necessary	to	extend	the	analysis	to	include	moral	dimension	
and	public	ethics:	“the	violation	of	social	norms	is	connected	with	higher	costs	of	being	active	in	
the	informal	sector.	Similarly,	better	institutions	provide	stronger	incentives	to	behave	legally	and	
increase	 the	 cost	 of	 illegal	 activities	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 greater	 institutional	 accountability.”6	
Therefore,	to	explain	international	differences	in	the	size	of	the	underground	economy,	it	 is	also	
advisable	to	focus	on	individual	morale,	social	norms,	and	public	ethics.	
	
Many	papers	have	investigated	whether	differences	in	tax	morale	across	countries	tends	to	reflect	
considerable	variations	in	the	shadow	economy	and	tax	evasion.	Alm-Togler	(2006)	addressed	the	
                                                
4	See	among	others,	Torgler-Schneider	(2006,	2009),	Torgler	(2003,	2004,	2005,	2006,	2007),	Alm-Torgler	(2006),	Feld-
Torgler	 (2007),	 Frey-Torgler	 (2007),	 Lago-Penas-Lago-Penas	 (2010),	 Lewis-Carrera-Cullis-Jones	 (2009),Tsakumis-
Curatola-Porcano	(2007),	Alm-Martinez-Vasquez-Torgler	(2006),	Alm-Martinez-Vasquez	(2007)	and	Halla	(2010).		
5	See	Torgler-Schneider	(2009).	
6Torgler-Schneider	(2009).	
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case	of	Europe	and	the	USA,	and	found	a	strong	negative	correlation	between	the	two	variables.	
Alm-Martinez-Vasquez-Torgler	 (2006)	 investigated	 transition	 countries,	 and	 obtained	 the	 same	
result;	specifically,	countries	with	low	tax	morale	show	a	clear	pattern	of	a	larger	shadow	economy.	
Torgler-Schneider	 (2009)	 considered	 a	 large	 number	 of	 countries,	 and	 found	 evidence	 that	 a	
higher	degree	of	a	nation’s	tax	morale	reduces	the	size	of	the	shadow	economy	in	that	country.	
Alm-Martinez-Vasquez	 (2007)	 and	 Torgler	 (2005)	 investigated	 the	 role	 of	 tax	 morale	 in	 Latin	
America,	 and	 found	 that	 it	 was	 related	 to	 the	 size	 of	 the	 shadow	 economy.	 Torgler	 (2004)	
investigated	 the	 case	 of	 Asian	 Countries	 and	 found	 that	 trust	 in	 the	 government	 and	 the	 legal	
system	have	a	positive	effect	on	tax	morale;	therefore,	implying	that	this	should	reduce	the	size	of	
the	shadow	economy,	with	this	hypothesis	being	confirmed	by	Torgler	(2007).	
	
The	 role	 of	 tax	morale	 is	 important	 in	 relation	 to	 both	 tax	 structure	 and	 public	 spending.	 In	 a	
recent	 paper,	 Barone	 and	 Mocetti	 (2011)	 investigated	 the	 determinant	 of	 tax	 morale	 at	 the	
municipal	 level	 in	 Italy.	 The	 authors	 showed	 that	 inefficiency	 in	 public	 expenditure	 (negatively)	
shapes	individual	tax	morale;	in	particular,	that	at	the	level	of	Italian	municipalities,	where	public	
spending	 is	 more	 inefficient,	 tax	 morale	 is	 lower,	 even	 when	 the	 authors	 did	 not	 use	 the	 EVS	
(European	Value	Survey)	and	WVS	(World	Value	Survey),	but	the	Survey	on	Household	Income	and	
wealth	 of	 the	 Bank	 of	 Italy.	 Therefore,	 even	 when	 using	 a	 different	 data	 set,	 the	 relationship	
between	 tax	morale	 and	 the	main	 characteristics	 of	 the	 public	 sector	 is	 largely	 confirmed.	 The	
implication	 is	 that	 an	 efficient	 public	 service	 provision	may	 promote	 a	 “cooperative	 reaction	 of	
taxpayers	in	the	form	of	a	better	attitude	toward	fiscal	duties.”	
	
The	 evidence	 and	 econometric	 estimates	 show	 that	 in	most	 specifications,	 tax	morale	 is	 highly	
significant	in	explaining	the	level	of	the	underground	economy.	Tax	morale	helps	explain	the	rate	
of	 tax	compliance	and	 the	size	of	 the	shadow	economy	to	a	 substantial	extent.	Furthermore,	 in	
some	 areas	 and	 regions	 of	 the	 world,	 tax	 cheating	 may	 be	 attributed	 to	 the	 tax	 morale	 of	
taxpayers.	
	
At	this	point,	it	is	worth	considering	the	possible	determinants	of	tax	morale.	Possible	parameters	
include:	a)	historical	factors,	traditions	and	heritage	tend	to	matter	when	shaping	public	ethics	and	
morale;	 b)	 demographic	 and	 ethnic	 status;	 c)	 the	 importance	 of	 faith	 and	 religion;	 in	 general,	
religiosity	 is	 correlated	with	 the	 shadow	economy;	d)	 the	 role	of	 the	 family	and	 the	 strength	of	
family	ties.	
	
Lago-Penas-Lago-Penas	 (2010)	 show	 that	 tax	morale	 in	European	countries	 varies	 regularly	with	
socio-demographic	characteristics,	personal	financial	experiences,	political	attitudes,	and	regional	
GDP,	in	addition	to	some	ethnic	and	linguistic	fractionalizations.	Torgler	(2006)	also	addresses	the	
role	 of	 religion	 in	 shaping	 moral	 value	 and	 tax	 morale	 and,	 therefore,	 tax	 evasion.	 By	 using	 a	
weighted	 ordered	 probit	 model,	 Torgler	 found	 that	 religiosity	 and	 tax	 morale	 are	 positively	
correlated,	 even	 though	 this	 effect	 tends	 to	 vary	 somewhat	 for	 sub-groups	 of	 religion,	 such	 as	
Catholic,	Protestant,	Jewish,	Hindu,	Moslem,	and	Buddhist.	However,	the	author	states	that	these	
results	should	be	treated	and	accepted	with	caution,	given	some	difficulties	with	the	data.	
	
Summarizing	the	main	results,	in	general,	tax	morale	tends	to	rise	with	age,	is	lower	for	the	self-
employed	 and	 unemployed,	 for	 upper-class	 individuals,	 and	 is	 also	 positively	 correlated	 with	
education.	National	 pride	 increases	 tax	morale.	 Tax	morale	 is	 stronger	 for	 students	 and	 retired	
people,	 for	 women	 and	 married	 people,	 but	 weaker	 for	 individuals	 living	 together,	 whereas	
financial	satisfaction	increases	tax	morale.	Trustworthiness	increases	tax	morale,	while	perceived	
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corruption	 strongly	 reduces	 it.	 Finally,	 religiosity	 tends	 to	 increase	 tax	 morale;	 however,	 this	
aspect	is	subject	to	controversy.	
	
	
4.	Family	and	transmission	of	social	values	
	
Another	 stream	 of	 research7	has	 instead	 emphasized	 the	 models	 of	 cultural	 transmission,	 in	
particular	the	transmission	of	social	status	and	cultural	traits;	however,	we	may	also	assume	the	
same	for	public	morale,	at	 least	for	 its	main	components.	Starting	from	the	economic	models	of	
interdependence	 of	 preferences,	 some	 authors	 have	 argued	 “children	 are	 born	 naïve,	with	 not	
well-defined	 preferences	 and	 cultural	 traits.	 They	 acquire	 preferences	 through	 observation,	
imitation	and	adoption	of	cultural	models	with	which	they	are	matched.	Children	are	first	matched	
with	their	family	(‘vertical	transmission’),	and	then	with	the	population	at	large,	e.g.	teachers,	role	
models,	etc.	 (‘oblique	transmission’).	 In	other	words,	parents	purposefully	attempt	at	socializing	
their	 children	 to	 a	 particular	 trait.(…)	 but	 parents	 can	 perceive	 welfare	 of	 their	 children	 only	
through	 the	 filter	 of	 their	 own	 (the	 parents’)	 preferences.	 This	 particular	 form	 of	 myopia	
(‘imperfect	empathy’)	is	quite	crucial.”	
	
Along	this	line,	therefore,	one	may	assume	that	cultural	traits,	moral	values,	and	social	capital	(e.g.,	
trust	in	institutions)	may	be	essentially	transmitted		(although	not	exclusively)	by	families	to	their	
heirs,	and	that,	within	a	certain	equilibrium,	these	values	tend	to	remain	stable,	at	least	within	a	
certain	span	of	 time.	 In	 fact,	 the	persistence	of	moral	values,	 the	degree	of	civicness,	and	social	
capital	in	most	of	developed	countries,	and	in	particular	in	some	Italian	regions,	which	were	first	
proved	by	Putnam	to	extend	across	least	six	centuries,	should	confirm	the	stability	of	moral	value	
within	the	members	of	various	families,	and	in	some	specific	social	and	economic	context.	Family	
matters,	 and	 matters	 a	 great	 deal.	 Family	 shapes	 the	 moral	 values	 of	 individual	 members,	 in	
particular	 the	cultural	 traits	of	 the	youngest,	and	 in	 the	end	affect	public	ethos	and	 tax	morale.	
Therefore,	the	transmission	of	these	cultural	values	within	the	same	family	along	different	periods	
of	 time	would	 also	 inevitably	 imply	 some,	more	 or	 less	 pronounced,	 stability	 of	 public	morale,	
social	capital,	and	trustworthiness.	We	might	imagine	the	existence	of	different	multiple	equilibria,	
some	positive,	some	more	negative,	within	which,	however,	there	is	clear	difficulty	to	shift	from	
one	to	another.	
	
Of	 course,	 apart	 from	 vertical	 transmission,	 there	 is	 also	 some,	 more	 or	 less	 intense,	 form	 of	
oblique	transmission,	where	the	social	context	(e.g.,	school,	neighborly-ness,	etc.)	helps	to	share	
moral	 values.	 In	 general,	we	observe	 strong	homogeneity	 among	 the	 various	 communities,	 and	
people’s	choice	to	reside	in	areas	where	other	individuals	live	that	share	the	same	values.	We	also	
observe	 a	 strong	 persistence	 of	 cultural	 traits,	 attitudes,	 values,	 and	 lifestyles	 among	 various	
communities,	with	 some	pronounced	 resilience	of	 cultural	 traits	 and	heterogeneous	 values.	 For	
example,	Orthodox	Jewish	communities	in	the	United	States,	but	also	elsewhere	in	the	world,	are	
a	clear	example	of	culture	persistence.	Outside	the	US,	we	have	the	well-known	case	of	Corsicans,	
Catalans,	Irish	Catholics,	and	Italians,	especially	in	Northern	Europe	(see	Bisin-Verdier,	2010).		
	
More	specifically	with	the	case	of	Italy,	in	some	recent	works,	Guiso-Sapienza-Zingales	(2006,	2007,	
2010)	and	Butler-Giuliano-Guiso	(2009)	show	that	social	capital	tends	to	persist	over	the	long-term	
(more	 than	 five	centuries)	and	explain	 the	contemporary	variation	of	 social	 capital	 in	 Italy,	with	
                                                
7	See	among	others,	Bisin-Topa	(2002),	Bisin-	Verdier	(1998,	2000,	2010).	
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the	 experience	 of	 free-city-state	 in	 the	 Middle	 Age.	 With	 a	 different	 approach	 based	 on	
instrumental	variables,	Tabellini	(2008,	2010)	links	cross-country	variation	in	measures	of	trust	to	
the	quality	of	political	institutions	in	the	nineteenth	century	and,	therefore,	following	the	seminal	
works	of	Banfield	(1958)	and	Putnam	(1993),	attributes	the	persistence	of	institutions	to	indicators	
of	 individual	values	and	beliefs,	 such	as	 trust	and	respect	 for	others.	Along	the	same	 line,	some	
recent	literature	proves	the	long-term	persistence	and	long	lasting	effects	of	institutions	on	socio-
economic	outcomes8.	Of	course,	the	finding	of	some	significant	and	robust	statistical	correlations	
does	not	imply	casual	relationships,	and	the	endogeneity	needs	addressing.	
	
	
5.	Family	ties	and	the	power	of	the	family	
	
The	first	author	who	clearly	described	the	importance	of	family	ties	was	Edward	Banfield	in	19589,	
as	 a	 consequence	 of	 his	 research	 in	 the	 South	 of	 Italy.	 The	 author	 depicts	 family	 as	 “amoral	
familism,”	a	situation	in	which	there	is	“inability	of	the	villagers	to	act	together	for	their	common	
good	or,	indeed,	for	any	end	transcending	the	immediate,	material	interest	of	the	nuclear	family.	
This	 inability	 to	 concert	 activity	 beyond	 the	 immediate	 family	 arises	 from	 an	 ethos	 –	 that	 of	
‘amoral	 familism	 (…)(according	 to	which	people)	maximize	 the	material,	 short	 run	advantage	of	
the	nuclear	family;	and	assume	that	all	others	will	do	likewise”	(p.	9).	
	
Therefore,	 “in	 a	 society	 of	 amoral	 familists,	 no	 one	 will	 further	 the	 interest	 of	 the	 group	 or	
community	 except	 as	 it	 is	 to	 his	 private	 advantage	 to	 do	 so”	 (p.	 83).	 In	 this	 society,	 it	 is	 very	
difficult	to	build	and	maintain	public	organizations	given	the	selfish	attitude	of	individuals	who	rely	
exclusively	 on	 family.	 “The	 inducements	 which	 lead	 people	 to	 contribute	 their	 activity	 to	
organizations	 are	 to	 an	 important	 degree	 unselfish	 (e.g.,	 identification	with	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	
organization)	 and	 they	 are	 often	 non-material.	 Moreover,	 it	 is	 a	 condition	 of	 successful	
organization	 that	 members	 have	 some	 trust	 in	 each	 other	 and	 some	 loyalty	 to	 the	
organization”(87).	
	
In	a	similar	vein,	 in	1964,	Luigi	Barzini,	 in	an	extraordinary	book	on	“The	 Italians,”	wrote10:	 “the	
first	source	of	power	 is	 the	 family.	 (…)	Scholars	have	always	recognized	the	 Italian	 family	as	 the	
only	 fundamental	 institution	 in	 the	 country,	 a	 spontaneous	 creation	 of	 the	 national	 genius,	
adapted	 through	 the	 centuries	 to	 changing	 conditions,	 the	 real	 foundation	 of	 whichever	 social	
order	prevails.	In	fact,	the	law,	the	State	and	society	function	only	if	they	do	not	directly	interfere	
with	the	family’s	supreme	interests.”	
	
Of	course,	as	Barzini	argued,	this	aspect	is	not	new,	unique,	or	so	surprising,	since	in	many	other	
countries	 and	among	other	people,	 “where	 legal	 authority	 is	weak	and	 the	 law	 is	 resented	and	
resisted,	 the	 safety	 and	 welfare	 of	 the	 individual	 are	 mainly	 assured	 by	 the	 family.”	 There	 is,	
however,	an	important	difference	between	the	Italian	case	and	those	of	other	people	who	use	the	
family	as	their	private	lifeboat.	In	Italy,	it	is	not	simply	“a	way	of	life,	a	spontaneous	condition	of	
society,	 a	 natural	 development:	 it	 is	 also	 the	 deliberate	 product	 of	 man’s	 will,	 the	 fruit	 of	 his	
choice;	it	has	been	assiduously	cultivated	and	strengthened	down	the	centuries.”	The	strength	of	
                                                
8	See	 Bisin-Verdier	 (2010)	 and	 Acemoglu-Robinson	 (2011),	 North	 (1990)	 La	 Porta-Lopez	 de	 Silanes-Shleifer-Vishny	
(1997).	
9Banfield	(1958).	
10Barzini	(1964,	p.	190).	
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the	family	has	to	be	acknowledged,	therefore,	as	one	of	the	principal	causes	of	the	development	
of	weak	and	low-quality	political	institutions.	
	
This	characteristic	of	family	ties	is	the	key	core	of	Italian	society	(but	is	also	a	general	characteristic	
of	 many	 other	 countries	 in	 Southern	 Europe11and	 Asia),	 and	 has	 attracted	 some	 studies	 and	
research	 projects	 over	 the	 last	 30	 years.	We	 cannot	 provide	 a	 full	 account	 of	 these	 books	 and	
papers	 here;	 instead,	 we	 have	 identified	 some	 interesting	 examples,	 along	 with	 the	 most	
significant.	 A	 clear	 reference	 to	 this	 particular	 structure	 of	 the	 family	 was	 identified	 in	 the	
sixteenth	century	by	Guicciardini	(1983);	at	the	start	of	the	nineteenth	century	by	Goethe	(1983),	
Stendhal	(1956)	and	Leopardi	(1991);	and	more	recently	by	Turiello	(1882–1980),	Salvemini	(1928),	
Gramsci	(1977),	Putnam	(1993)	and	Gambino	(1998).	The	main,	common	point	is	that	the	strength	
of	the	family	tends	to	hamper	peoples’	active	participation	in	collective	life.	
	
Reduced	participation	 in	 public	 life	 has	 also	 been	 studied	 recently	 in	 the	US	 by	 Robert	 Putnam	
(2000),	who	 argues	 that	 since	 1950,	 the	USA	has	 experienced	 a	 strong	decline	 in	 social	 capital;	
whereby,	“all	the	forms	of	in-person	social	intercourse	upon	which	Americans	used	to	found	and	
enrich	the	fabric	of	their	social	lives.”	The	reduction	in	the	degree	of	active	civil	engagement	and	
political	involvement	worsens	the	quality	of	democracy.	In	a	similar	vein,	Francis	Fukuyama	(1995)	
argues	in	a	book	dedicated	to	the	analysis	of	trust	and	social	capital	that	“though	it	may	seem	a	
stretch	to	compare	Italy	with	the	Confucian	culture	of	Hong-Kong	and	Taiwan,	the	nature	of	social	
capital	is	similar	in	certain	respects.	In	parts	of	Italy	and	in	the	Chinese	cases,	family	bonds	tend	to	
be	stronger	than	other	kinds	of	social	bonds	not	based	on	kinship,	while	the	strength	and	number	
of	 intermediate	 associations	 between	 state	 and	 individual	 has	 been	 relatively	 low,	 reflecting	 a	
pervasive	 distrust	 of	 people	 outside	 the	 family.	 The	 consequences	 for	 industrial	 structure	 are	
similar:	 private	 sector	 firms	 tend	 to	 be	 relatively	 small	 and	 family-controlled,	 while	 large-scale	
enterprises	need	the	support	of	the	state	to	be	viable.”	
	
The	 key	 finding	 is,	 therefore,	 that	 amoral	 familism	 tends	 to	 produce	 a	 special	 and	 stable	 social	
equilibrium,	 in	 which	 people	 exclusively	 trust	 and	 care	 about	 their	 immediate	 family:	 “expect	
everybody	else	to	behave	in	that	way,	and	therefore	(rationally)	do	not	trust	non-family	members	
and	do	not	expect	to	be	trusted	outside	the	family”	(Alesina-Giuliano,	2011)12.	The	‘power	of	the	
family’	on	individuals	tends	to	affect	their	degree	of	political	participation;	therefore,	resulting	in	
low	 civic	 engagement	 and	 low	 generalized	 trust,	 confidence	 in	 public	 life,	 and	 the	 quality	 of	
political	 institutions.	 Being	 convinced	 that	 politics	 is	 a	 private	matter,	 people	will	 not	 have	 the	
incentive	to	become	engaged	in	political	and	public	activities,	except	when	this	is	completed	out	
of	self-interest	alone.	This	kind	of	familism	is	predicted	to	hinder	the	development	of	high-quality	
political	institutions,	the	pursuit	of	the	common	good,	and	participation	in	public	affairs.	
	
However,	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 family	 has	 also	 been	 largely	 acknowledged	 in	 other	 related	
contexts.	For	example,	 in	 studies	by	Bisin	and	Verdier	 (2000,	2010)	on	 the	cultural	 transmission	
and	the	evolution	and	persistence	of	ethnic	and	religious	traits	as	dynamic	properties	of	cultural	
transmission	 and	 socialization	 mechanism,	 the	 authors	 argue	 that	 these	 devices	 are	 strongly	
centered	on	the	role	of	the	family.	
	
	
                                                
11And,	of	course,	according	to	Barzini,	Putnam	and	other	authors,	also	countries	in	South	America	and	Asia	(China,	for	
example).	
12	Alesina-Giuliano	(2011)	but	see	also	Alesina-Giuliano	(2010).	
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In	summary,	there	is	clear	evidence	across	extensive	literature	that:	
	
a)	In	Southern	European	countries,	the	role	of	the	family	is	very	important;	however,	we	must	be	
cautious,	as	this	phenomenon	is	also	true	in	many	other	developed	and	less	developed	countries;	
b)	Studies	have	demonstrated	that	countries	where	family	matters	tend	to	show	less	social	capital,	
less	participation,	weaker	political	involvement,	and	a	lower	degree	of	trust;	
c)	 Societies	 that	 rely	 heavily	 on	 families	 tend	 to	 have	 a	 lesser	 degree	 of	 trustworthiness	 and	
confidence	in	public	institutions;	
d)	 Family	 ties	 are	 often	 associated	 with	 negative	 economic	 performance,	 reduced	 rate	 of	
investment,	and	growth;	
e)	Therefore,	we	may	expect	that	countries	where	family	ties	are	strong	also	tend	to	have	a	larger	
underground	economy.	
	
It	is	important	to	be	clear	about	the	possible	implications	of	family	ties.	For	instance,	we	are	not	
saying	that	family	ties	are	always	bad…	“Strong	or	weak	family	ties	are	neither	“bad”	nor	“good”	
but	they	lead	to	different	organizations	of	the	family”13	and	have	different	economic,	moral,	and	
social	implications.	There	is	some	evidence,	in	fact,	that	happiness	and	life	satisfaction	is	positively	
correlated	with	strong	family	ties.		
	
However,	we	believe	that	the	investigation	of	these	implications	is	worthwhile.	In	particular,	Italy	
raises	 the	 issue	of	whether	the	strength	of	 the	 family	could	be	the	main	cause	of	weak	political	
institutions	 and	 low	 social	 capital.	 However,	 a	 strong	 correlation	 does	 not	 necessarily	 imply	
causality.	 In	 other	words,	 this	 brings	 up	 the	 complex	problem	of	 reverse	 causality:	 “do	political	
institutions	flourish	only	where	the	family	is	weak,	or	is	it	the	other	way	around?	Does	the	family	
become	self-sufficient	only	where	the	political	institutions	are	not	strong	enough?”14	
	
When	the	role	of	the	family	is	strong,	civic	duty	tends	to	be	low,	along	with	social	capital	and	tax	
morale,	and	in	the	end	tax	compliance.	When	family	ties	are	weak,	on	the	other	hand,	trust	in	the	
public	sector	tends	to	result	in	higher	tax	morale	and	greater	civic	duty,	while	tax	evasion	is	lower.	
	
Therefore,	in	this	paper	we	investigate	whether	family	ties	and	the	power	of	the	family	affect	the	
degree	and	the	size	of	the	underground	economy.	To	the	best	of	our	knowledge,	this	 is	the	first	
study	that	attempts	 to	address	 this	 issue.	Our	point	 is	very	simple:	amoral	 familism,	particularly	
strong	 family	 ties,	 tends	 to	 influence	 the	 quality	 of	 institutions,	 since	 the	 end	 product	 is	 a	
particular	 type	 of	 civic	 involvement	 and	 political	 participation.	 All	 of	 this	 inevitably	 affects	 the	
degree	 of	 trust	 of	 various	 specific	 components	 of	 society;	 therefore,	 the	way	 that	 people	 view	
public	institutions	tends	to	matter.		
	
Strong	 family	 ties	 induce	 less	 political	 participation,	 less	 trust	 in	 the	 public	 sector;	 hence	
government	action	may	affect	tax	morale	and	the	underground	economy	in	some	way.	If	one	does	
not	believe	in	(or	trust)	public	action,	why	then	should	one	fully	comply	with	taxes?	
                                                
13Alesina-Giuliano	(2011).	
14Barzini	(1964,	191).	There	is	also	another	interesting	issue,	which	was	brought	up	by	Fukuyama	(1999)	and	Putnam	
(1998),	on	possible	links	between	family	ties	and	maternal	mentality	with	the	role	of	Catholic	Church:	“Italians	in	the	
South	were	much	less	likely	to	read	newspapers,	belong	to	unions,	vote	and	otherwise	take	part	in	the	political	life	of	
their	 communities	 than	 others.	Moreover,	 people	 in	 the	 South	 expressed	 a	much	 lower	 degree	 of	 social	 trust	 and	
confidence	in	the	law-abiding	behavior	of	their	follow	citizens.	(…)	Italian	Catholicism	correlates	negatively	with	civic-
mindedness:	when	measured	by	indexes	like	attendance	at	mass,	religious	marriage,	rejection	of	divorce,	and	so	on,	it	
grows	stronger	the	farther	south	one	moves,	and	civic-mindedness	grows	weaker”	(Fukuyama	1995,	100).	
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In	this	paper,	we	provide	evidence	that	strong	family	ties	are	directly	related	to	the	underground	
economy,	 and	are	 indirectly	 related	 to	 generalized	 trust	 and	 civic	 engagement.	By	 reducing	 the	
degree	of	social	capital,	family	ties	negatively	affect	tax	morale	and	positively	affect	the	dimension	
of	the	underground	economy.	
	
	
6.	‘Mother’	and	family	ties	
	
There	is,	however,	another	interesting	issue	that	we	address	in	this	paper.	The	power	of	the	family	
in	certain	societies	seems	to	strongly	depend	on	 the	 ‘role	of	 the	mother’	within	 the	 family.	The	
different	 role	of	 the	 father	and	 the	mother	within	 the	 family	 should	mostly	explain	 the	 ‘familial	
mentality,’	 which	 gives	 rise	 to	 loose	 collective	 responsibilities	 and	 civic	 involvements.	 Gambino	
(1998,	 39-50)	 and	 Simone	 (2005)	 but,	 before	 them,	 Turiello	 (1887)	 and	 Bachofen	 (1949),	 have	
argued	that	Italy,	as	a	 ‘paese	materno’	 (maternal	country),	tends	to	apply	a	familist	mentality	to	
social	and	public	behaviors.	 It	 is	 important	to	emphasize	that	this	mentality	does	not	necessarily	
derive	from	the	family	itself,	rather	from	the	‘figura	femminile,	che	è	quella	della	donna	in	quanto	
“madre	di	famiglia”	(female	figure	who	is	that	of	the	woman	as	a	“family’s	mother”).	It	is	not	the	
family	 in	 a	 general	 sense	 that	matters	 in	 this	 case15,	 but	 the	 role	 of	 the	 “woman-mother”	 that	
makes	the	‘familist	mentality,’	which	is	better	described	as	‘mother’	or	maternal	mentality’.	
	
Another	 interesting	 example	 of	 the	 key	 relevance	 of	 the	 family	 in	 Italian	 society	 comes	 from	
Barzini	(1958):	“Italy	has	often	been	defined	as	nothing	more	than	a	mosaic	of	millions	of	families,	
sticking	 together	 by	 blind	 instinct,	 like	 colonies	 of	 insects,	 an	 organic	 formation	 rather	 than	 a	
rational	 construction	 of	 written	 statutes	 and	 moral	 imperatives	 […]	 there	 is	 nothing	 new,	
surprising	or	unique.	 In	many	countries	and	among	many	people,	past	and	present,	where	 legal	
authority	 is	weak	and	the	 law	 is	resented	and	resisted,	the	family	mainly	assures	the	safety	and	
welfare	of	individuals.	The	Chinese,	for	instance,	in	their	imperial	days	held	the	cult	of	the	family	
more	praiseworthy	than	the	love	of	country	and	the	love	of	good.”	
	
In	human	history,	and	in	general,	different	types	of	families	exist.	Examples	include	(1)	the	nuclear	
patriarchal	 large	 family	based	on	 the	 concept	of	 authority;	 (2)	 a	 family	 in	which	 the	 role	of	 the	
mother	 is	 prevalent	 with	 respect	 to	 that	 of	 the	 father;	 and	 (3)	 an	 extended	 family	 with	 weak	
constraints	within	their	members.	
	
The	 importance	 of	 mother	 mentality	 is	 at	 least	 true	 for	 Italy,	 and	 most	 countries	 in	 Southern	
Europe;	 however,	 clear	 similar	 characteristics	 also	 emerge	 for	 China	 and	 the	 Jewish	
tradition.16However,	it	 is,	of	course,	important	to	stress	that	this	distinction	should	not	be	based	
on	the	‘biological	nature’,	rather	on	a	‘cultural	dimension’	and	should	be	identified	as	the	product	
of	 a	 collective	mental	 structure17.	 This	 ‘mother	mentality’	 tends	 to	produce	a	 specific	 collective	
attitude,	which	strengthens	the	blood	ties	among	family	members,	implies	a	low	level	of	civicness,	
and	a	reduced	degree	of	trust	 in	other	people	and	public	 institutions.	Of	course,	one	 interesting	
issue	may	be	to	assess	how	much	this	phenomenon	depends	on	the	different	 role	 that	a	 father	
usually	has	 in	educating	children	and	transmitting	moral	values	compared	to	that	of	the	mother	
                                                
15	See	on	this	Gambino	(1998,	40).		
16Woody	Allen’s	movies	are	in	this	regard	an	interesting	reference:	he	frequently	has	a	vision	of	his	mother	giving	him	
any	kind	of	advice.	On	the	importance	of	family	in	China,	see	Fukuyama	(1995).		
17	See	Gambino,	1998,	63.		
 13 
(i.e.,	the	‘absence’	of	the	father).	Table	12	shows	some	empirical	evidence	on	the	opposite	role	of	
parents	on	family	ties;	the	importance	of	the	mother	has	a	positive	relationship	with	the	strength	
of	family	ties.	
	
The	 “mammismo,”	 or	 ‘mother	 culture,’	 that	 largely	 pervades	 some	 societies,	 has	 been	 long	
acknowledged	as	a	key	characteristic	of	the	Italian	society.	This	feature	may	be	considered	as	the	
tendency	to	forgive,	which	comes	out	as	a	product	of	this	widespread	mother	culture.	The	attitude	
to	provide	children	with	“an	immediate	and	physical	protection,	with	the	removal	of	any	possible	
fatigue	or	assumption	of	individual	responsibility.”18	
	
The	mother	mentality	is	the	opposite	of	the	paternal	approach:	“the	father	takes	care	of	external	
relations,	 is	 involved	 in	war	 and	 defense	 activities.”	 The	 father	 judges	 his	 children,	 and	 should	
provide	them	with	the	feeling	for	rules	and	order.	The	mother,	instead,	lives	at	home,	is	extremely	
protective,	 tends	to	 justify	 (all)	 their	children,	and	 is	 fully	dedicated	to	their	development19.	The	
mother	has	 a	 key	 role	 in	ensuring	 the	 species	 conservation	and	 the	perpetuation	of	 the	 family.	
Therefore,	the	asymmetric	role	of	the	father	and	the	mother	within	the	family	may	largely	explain	
the	different	effects	of	the	family	on	 individuals,	which	 in	turn	 influence	economic	behavior	and	
civic	and	cultural	values.	This	maternal	mentality	 (familism)	 is	 far	 from	any	public	morale,	and	 it	
inevitably	damages	the	growth	of	any	ethics,	social	accountability,	and	civicness.		
	
As	Salvemini	summarized	in	1928	“tax	morale	of	Italians	is	essentially	a	family	morale.	Within	the	
family	range,	each	member	helps	each	other	with	unconscious	heroism,	accepting	as	a	duty	event	
the	worst	 sacrifice	 (…).	 But	 the	 social	morale	 is	 loose.	 Government	 is	 considered	 as	 something	
unrelated	and	hostile	to	the	people”	(Salvemini,	1928).	The	familist	mentality	tends	to	produce	a	
generalized	tolerance20	for	their	members,	which	postpones	any	decisions	needed,	with	adult	age;	
“being	a	‘figlio	di	mamma’	[mother	son],	the	male-son	deserves	any	justifications	and	pardon,	”in	
any	case.	
	
However,	 in	our	work	after	our	FE	(Fixed	Effect)	panel	estimates,	we	use	the	role	of	the	mother	
and	 of	 the	 father	 as	 an	 instrumental	 variable	 to	 appraise	 possible	 causal	 effects	 between	 the	
underground	economy	and	tax	morale.	
	
	
7.	Data	description		
	
The	 dataset	 combines	 data	 on	 personal	 values	 and	 social	 capital,	with	 an	 index	 of	 the	 shadow	
economy.	Variables	 related	 to	personal	values	are	based	on	different	waves	of	 the	WVS	 (World	
Value	Survey)	and	EVS	(European	Value	Survey).	These	research	projects	collect	national	surveys	
on	 values	 concerning	 a	 large	 number	 of	 issues:	 from	 perceptions	 of	 life	 to	 family	 values,	 from	
personal	beliefs	(on	religion	and	civic	participation)	to	political	involvement,	from	national	identity	
to	public	morale.	The	 level	of	 coverage	changes	every	 time,	both	with	 regard	 to	 the	number	of	
countries	involved	and	the	issues	surveyed;	however,	a	certain	number	of	topics	are	investigated	
using	the	same	questions	in	every	wave.	These	surveys	collect	answers	to	a	single	questionnaire,	
                                                
18Simone	(2005,	84).	
19 In	 the	 tradition	 of	 the	 Italian	 film	 and	 theatre	 there	 are	 many	 perfect	 examples	 of	 the	 features	 of	 very	
comprehensive	mothers	who	try	to	defend	their	heirs	and,	in	particular,	to	protect	and	justify	“i	devianti.”	
20Simone	(2005,	89).	
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which	 is	 usually	 made	 up	 of	 140	 questions	 for	 less	 than	 400	 variables,	 from	 a	 sample	 of	
approximately	1,500	people	in	each	country.		
	
Tax	morale	measures	the	willingness	of	people	to	behave	honestly	in	matters	of	the	public	sector	
domain.	Both	the	World	Value	Survey	and	the	European	Value	Survey	report	a	wide	range	of	tax	
morale	issues.	In	these	surveys,	tax	morale	has	been	measured	with	different	dimensions,	such	as	
a)	claiming	state	benefits	which	you	are	not	entitled	to;	b)	accepting	bribes	in	the	course	of	one’s	
duties;	 c)	 avoiding	payment	of	 tickets	 on	public	 transport;	 d)	 cheating	on	 taxes	 if	 you	have	 the	
chance	(see	Table	1).	
	
People	have	been	asked	to	express	their	opinion	according	to	the	following	scale:	“Please	tell	me	
whether	you	think	the	following	statements	can	always	be	justified,	never	justified,	or	something	
in	between:	(…).”	The	answers	are	classified	from	1	to	10,	where	1	is	for	never	justifiable	and	10	is	
for	always	justifiable.		
	
To	 measure	 the	 strength	 of	 family	 ties,	 we	 use	 three	 different	 variables	 that	 denote	 the	
importance	of	the	family	(importance	of	family),	the	relevance	of	love	and	respect	for	one’s	own	
parents	(love	parents),	and	the	duties	and	responsibilities	of	parents	towards	children	(help	child).	
These	variables	refer	to	three	different	questions.	The	first	collects	opinions	about	the	importance	
of	 the	 family,	with	 1	 indicating	 it	 is	 very	 important	 and	 4	 indicating	 it	 is	 less	 important.	 In	 the	
second	question,	the	respondent	agrees	with	one	of	two	statements:	a)	“Regardless	of	what	the	
qualities	and	faults	of	one’s	parents	are,	one	must	always	love	and	respect	them;”	or	b)	“One	does	
not	have	the	duty	to	respect	and	 love	parents	who	have	not	earned	 it.	”The	third	question	asks	
whether	the	respondent	agrees	with	one	of	two	statements:	a)	“It	is	the	parents‘	duty	to	do	their	
best	for	their	children	even	at	the	expense	of	their	own	well-being;”	or	b)	“Parents	have	a	life	of	
their	own	and	should	not	be	asked	to	sacrifice	their	own	well-being	for	the	sake	of	their	children.”	
The	 first	 option	 for	 both	questions	 takes	 the	 value	of	 1,	while	 the	 second	alternative	 takes	 the	
value	 of	 2.	 In	 general,	 we	 obtained	 good	 results	 for	 the	 individual	 questions;	 however,	 to	 be	
certain	about	their	composite	effect,	we	took	the	principal	component	of	three	variables.	
	
We	check	the	importance	of	religion	in	people’s	life	by	using	a	set	of	two	different	variables.	The	
first	variable	is	linked	to	the	question	that	investigates	whether	the	respondent	considers	himself	
to	be	a	religious	person:	“Independently	of	whether	you	attend	Church	services,	do	you	consider	
yourself	 to	be	a	religious	person?”	 (religious	person).	Answers	vary	 from	1	to	3,	where	option	1	
represents	 “a	 religious	 person,”	 option	 2	 represents	 “a	 non-religious	 person,”	 and	 option	 3	
represents	“an	atheist.”	The	second	variable	checks	 the	 importance	of	 religion	 in	one’s	own	 life	
(religion).	The	variable	 refers	 to	 the	 following	question:	“…	 indicate	how	 important	 religion	 is	 in	
your	life.”	The	answers	range	from	1	to	4,	where	option	1	represents	“very	important”	and	option	
4	represents	“not	important	at	all”	(Table	1).	
	
We	measure	the	degree	of	trust	in	two	dimensions:	trust	in	public	institutions	and	the	church,	and	
trust	 in	 other	 people.	 We	 survey	 the	 first	 dimension	 of	 trust	 by	 using	 a	 set	 of	 two	 different	
variables,	which	are	based	on	the	answers	to	the	questions	that	investigate	the	level	of	trust	in	the	
following	institutions:	the	parliament	and	the	church.	Respondents	are	requested	to	express	their	
degree	of	trust	in	these	institutions	on	a	scale	that	ranges	from	1	to	4,	where	option	1	represents	
“high	trust”	and	option	4	represents	“no	trust	at	all.”	
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We	survey	the	degree	of	trust	in	other	people	by	using	a	variable	based	on	the	following	question:	
“Generally	 speaking,	 can	most	 people	 be	 trusted	 or	 do	 you	 (the	 respondent)	 need	 to	 be	 very	
careful	 in	dealing	with	people?”	Two	alternative	answers	were	possible:	a)	“most	people	can	be	
trusted”	or	b)	“you	need	to	be	very	careful.”	
	
To	measure	the	importance	of	politics	in	one’s	own	life,	we	use	a	variable	linked	to	a	question	that	
specifically	 investigates	 this	 subject.	 Answers	 to	 the	 question	 range	 from	 1	 to	 4,	 where	 1	
represents	 very	 important	 and	 4	 represents	 not	 important	 at	 all.	 We	 also	 use	 a	 variable	 that	
measures	people	political	orientation	on	a	scale	from	1	(left)	to	10	(right)	(see	table	1).	
	
Data	on	the	underground	economy	are	taken	from	Schneider	(2005),	Schneider	and	Enste	(2000,	
2002),	and	Schneider-Buehn-Montenegro	(2010).	These	authors	define	the	underground	economy	
in	 the	usual	way:	 “Underground	economy,	 in	 fact,	 includes	all	market-based	 legal	production	of	
goods	and	services	deliberately	concealed	from	public	authorities	in	order	to	avoid	the	payment	of	
taxes	or	welfare	 contributions,	meeting	 some	 legal	 requirements	 regarding	 the	 labor	market	or	
complying	 with	 administrative	 commitments.”	 In	 this	 way,	 the	 authors	 avoid	 addressing	 other	
components	 of	 the	 activities	 of	 the	 shadow	 economy,	 such	 as	 crime	 or	 other	 types	 of	 illegal	
actions.	Finally,	we	measure	the	level	of	corruption	by	using	the	Corruption	Perception	Index	(CPI),	
which	is	published	annually	by	Transparency	International	on	its	website	(see	Table	1).	
	
Table	1	presents	a	list	of	all	variables	and	data	sources	that	we	use	for	the	estimates.	We	use	three	
different	waves,	 both	 for	World	 Value	 Survey	 and	 for	 the	 European	 Value	 Survey.	 For	 the	 first	
Survey,	we	use	the	waves	of	1989–1993,	1999–2004,	and	2005–2008,	while	for	the	second	Survey,	
we	use	those	carried	out	in	1990,	1999,	and	2008.	
	
In	 Table	 2,	 the	 usual	 descriptive	 statistics	 are	 summarized,	 together	 with	 the	 number	 of	
observations	for	each	variable.	Table	3	lists	the	countries	that	were	available	for	each	of	the	three	
waves,	while	we	show	the	distribution	of	the	panel	structure	in	Figure	1,	where,	as	a	time	variable,	
we	consider	the	year	when	the	interview	took	place	in	each	country.	
	
In	Figure	2,	we	describe	the	first	variable	of	family	ties,	love	parents,	by	showing	the	distribution	of	
its	 average	 value	 in	 1990–2010	 among	 the	 countries	 that	 we	 considered	 in	 the	 econometric	
estimates.	 The	 distribution	 follows	 our	 general	 expectations,	 with	 some	 South	 European	 and	
developing	 countries	 showing	 a	 relatively	 high	 intensity	 of	 family	 ties	 (a	 low	 numerical	 value,	
closer	to	1),	while	the	countries	of	Northern	Europe	tended	to	show	a	high	numerical	value	(low	
family	ties).	The	same	pattern	is	also	confirmed,	with	some	minor	change	s(for	example,	Lithuania,	
Korea,	Hong	Kong,	Estonia),	by	 looking	at	 the	distribution	of	other	 indicators	of	 the	 intensity	of	
family	ties,	as	shown	by	the	variable	help	child	(Figure	3),	which	shows	an	even	higher	strength	of	
the	family	bond.	The	third	indicator,	the	importance	of	the	family	(importance	of	family),	shows	a	
quite	 different	 pattern,	 and	 in	 general,	 represents	 a	 lower	 value	 of	 the	 intensity	 of	 family	 ties	
(Figure	4)	
	
Figure	5	shows	the	size	of	the	underground	economy	among	the	sample	of	countries	considered	in	
the	econometric	estimate,	always	showing	the	average	value	for	the	period	1990–2007.	The	data	
confirm	that	Switzerland,	the	US,	and	Austria	(but	also,	the	Netherlands,	Great	Britain,	and	New	
Zealand)	 show	 the	 lowest	 level	 of	 underground	 economy,	 while	 some	 Developing	 and	 East	
European	countries	display	the	highest	level.	
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Figure	6	shows	the	fitted	value	line	that	exists	between	the	variable	love	parents	and	the	shadow	
economy	(as	an	average	for	1990–2007).	The	negative	slope	confirms	that	when	the	intensity	of	
family	ties	decreases	(a	higher	numerical	value),the	size	of	the	shadow	economy	also	decreases.	
The	same	negative	relationship	was	confirmed	in	Figure	7,	where	we	use	the	variable	help	child	as	
a	measure	of	family	ties.	In	Figure	8,	we	present	the	relationship	between	the	variable	family	and	
the	underground	economy;	contrary	to	the	two	previous	variables,	the	relationship	is	almost	flat.	
Finally,	 in	 Figure	 9,	 we	 show	 the	 distribution	 of	 our	 instrumental	 variables,	 “the	 role	 of	 the	
mother”	and	“the	role	of	the	father”	among	14	countries	for	which	data	are	available.	As	expected,	
countries	where	family	ties	are	more	intense	tend	to	show	a	larger	importance	in	the	role	of	the	
mother.	
	
Family	values	and	family	ties	are	variables	that	tend	to	be	strongly	persistent	across	time	within	
the	same	countries.	In	fact,	these	values	tend	to	change	very	slowly	across	time,	but	exhibit	huge	
differences	between	countries,	as	known	in	the	history	of	the	humankind.	We	have	clear	examples	
that	 the	 family	 is	 one	 of	 the	 more	 lasting	 institutions	 (including	 in	 old	 China,	 Italy,	 and	 North	
Africa),	and	that	its	role	tends	to	be	persistent	and	to	change	very	slowly	across	time.	According	to	
our	estimates,	more	than	55%	of	 the	variance	of	 family	 ties	 in	our	sample	of	110,146	 individual	
observations	 is	 explained	 by	 a	 country-fixed	 effect.	 The	 same	 result	 has	 been	 reported	 by	
Bertrand-Schoar	 (2006)	 in	a	paper	on	 the	 role	of	 the	 family	on	 the	 size	of	 firms.	 In	parallel,	we	
interpret	“these	findings	as	supportive	of	the	view	that	family	norms	have	a	 larger	country-level	
component”	rather	than	individual	variations	within	each	country.	Therefore,	we	believe	that	the	
best	empirical	strategy	to	capture	the	relationship	between	tax	morale	and	family	ties	(variables	
for	 which	 we	 have	 individual	 observations)	 is	 to	 estimate	 a	 linear	 panel	 data	 model	 with	 the	
individual	data	collapsed	at	the	country	level	to	control	for	a	real	country-fixed	effect21.	
	
	
8.	Empirical	strategy	
	
8.1.	The	panel	structure		
	
To	measure	the	 impact	of	 family	 ties	on	the	 level	of	 the	shadow	economy,	when	controlling	 for	
the	other	factors	that	may	affect	the	underground	economy,	we	estimate	the	following	liner	panel	
data	model:		
	
Yit = β0 + β1familytiesit + β2fiscalit + β3politicsit 
+ β4trustit+ β5religionit +αi + ηt+ εit 
                          (1) 
	
where	i is	the	country	index	and	t	 is	the	year	index.	The	dependent	variable	Y	 is	our	measure	of	
the	 underground	 economy,	 but	 also	 in	 the	 following	 specification,	 tax	 morale	 and	 corruption.	
Family	 ties	 are	 measured	 using	 “love	 parents,”	 “help	 child,”	 and	 “importance	 of	 family.”	 Tax	
morale	 is	 measured	 by	 using	 the	 four	 previously	 described	 variables:	 “cheating	 on	 taxes,”	
                                                
21	In	a	recent	paper,	in	contrast	to	the	mainstream	literature,	Ljunge	(2013)	finds	a	positive	relationship	between	the	
strength	of	family	ties	and	the	degree	of	tax	morale.	We	believe	that	these	surprising	results	are	due	to	the	fact	that	
the	author	is	using	individual	data	and	country-dummies	as	an	additional	regressor;	therefore,	“its	results	are	based	
on	within-country	variation,”	ignoring	the	main	component	of	between-country	variation.	
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“claiming	benefits,”	“bribe,”	and	“transport.”22	In	the	estimate	we	use	the	principal	component	of	
tax	morale	and	family	ties.	
	
The	 impact	 of	 tax	 burden	 is	measured	 using	 the	 variable	 fiscal,	which	 corresponds	 to	 the	 ratio	
between	revenue	from	taxes,	social	contributions,	and	other	revenues	over	GDP	published	by	the	
World	Bank.	Religion	includes	two	variables:	religion	and	religious	person;	trust	is	measured	using	
three	variables:	trust	government	and	trust	church	related	to	the	confidence	in	public	institutions,	
and	trust	people	related	to	the	confidence	in	other	citizens;	finally,	politics	is	measured	in	terms	of	
the	 importance	 of	 politics	 in	 people’s	 life	 (see	 Table	 1	 and	 2	 for	 a	 complete	 description	 of	 the	
variables),	and	a	variable	related	to	the	political	orientation	between	left	and	right.	Finally,	since	
we	are	using	a	fixed-effect	panel	data	model,	αi	is	the	country	fixed	effect,	which	is	captured	using	
country	dummies,	and	ηt	is	the	year	effect,	which	is	captured	using	year	dummies.	The	stochastic	
components	ε	is	assumed,	as	usual,	to	be	i.i.d (0, σ).	
	
We	expect	a	positive	relationship	between	the	level	of	the	shadow	economy,	tax	morale,	and	the	
level	of	the	tax	burden.	We	expect	the	higher	the	numeric	value	of	cheating	on	taxes	(that	is	to	say,	
a	 lower	 index	 of	 tax	morale),	 the	 higher	 the	 value	 of	 the	 underground	 economy	 should	 be.	 In	
addition,	we	expect	that	the	higher	the	percentage	of	fiscal	revenue	over	GDP,	the	larger	the	size	
of	the	shadow	economy.	
	
As	 in	the	case	of	tax	morale,	we	expect	a	positive	relationship	between	the	 level	of	the	shadow	
economy	and	the	strength	of	family	ties;	namely,	the	stronger	the	family	ties,	the	higher	the	level	
of	the	underground	economy.	
	
Since	 many	 variables	 are	 available	 for	 assessing	 the	 role	 of	 family	 ties	 and	 tax	 morale,	 we	
performed	 correlation	 analyses,	 which	 showed	 that	 all	 variables	 are	 strongly	 correlated	 –	 see	
Tables	4a	and	4b.	Therefore,	 for	the	sake	of	simplicity,	to	estimate	more	robust	coefficients,	we	
decided	to	perform	the	econometric	analysis	by	using	the	principal	component	of	these	variables	
(family	ties	and	tax	morale).	In	Table	5	and	6,	we	present	the	results	of	the	factor	analysis	on	tax	
morale	 and	 family	 ties.	 The	 relatively	 high	 value	 of	 the	 eigenvalues	 allows	 us	 to	 use	 just	 one	
component	for	both	groups	of	variables	in	the	econometric	estimates.	
	
Regarding	 the	 variables	 that	 refer	 to	 the	 degree	 of	 the	 importance	 of	 religion,	 we	 used	 two	
different	indexes.	We	hypothesized	that	there	might	be	in	general	a	positive	relationship	between	
religion	 and	 the	 underground	 economy;	whereby,	when	 the	 importance	 of	 religion	 is	 high,	 the	
level	 of	 the	 shadow	 economy	might	 tend	 to	 be	 greater.	 However,	 this	 is	 quite	 a	 controversial	
aspect,	 since	 one	 might	 also	 assume	 that	 stronger	 religiosity	 would	 involve	 more	 intense	 tax	
morale,	 an	 increased	 feeling	 for	 respecting	 norms	 and	 values,	 and,	 ultimately,	 a	 lower	 shadow	
economy.23	
	
Finally,	 regarding	 the	 relationship	 of	 the	 variables	 that	 compare	 the	 shadow	 economy	 and	 the	
degree	of	trust	in	public	institutions	and	other	people,	it	seems	reasonable	to	assume	that	when	
the	degree	of	trust	is	higher,	the	level	of	the	shadow	economy	becomes	lower.	
                                                
22Tax	morale	has	been	measured	by	different	dimensions,	such	as	a)	claiming	state	benefits	which	you	are	not	entitled	
to;	 b)	 accepting	 bribes	 in	 the	 course	 of	 one’s	 duties;	 c)	 avoiding	 payment	 of	 tickets	 on	 public	 transport;	 and	 d)	
cheating	on	taxes	if	you	have	the	chance.	
23Some	recent	works	 show	a	clear	negative	correlation	between	 religiosity	and	 the	underground	economy:	 see,	 for	
example,	Torgler-Schneider	(2009),	Heinemann-Schneider	(2011),	Torgler	(2003).	
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It	 is	 important	 to	note	 that	 the	absence	of	data	 for	 the	 level	of	 the	shadow	economy	(ue)	after	
2007	prevented	us	from	being	able	to	use	the	latest	data	about	family	ties	and	other	independent	
variables	 contained	 in	 the	 2008	 European	 and	World	 Values	 surveys.	 In	 order	 not	 to	 stop	 our	
dataset	in	2007,	we	have	forecasted	the	values	of	the	shadow	economy	using	the	fitted	values	of	
the	following	empirical	model:	
	
ueit = β0 + αi + η1 trend + η2 (trend * αi)+ εit                              (2) 
 
Therefore,	for	each	country	i,	the	values	for	the	level	of	the	shadow	economy	between	2008	and	
2010	correspond	to:		
	
• ue2008i = β^0 + α^i + η1^ 2008 + η2^(2008 * α^i)  
• ue2009i = β^0 + α^i + η1^ 2009 + η2^ (2009 * α^i) 
• ue2010i = β^0 + α^i + η1^ 2010 + η2^ (2010 * α^i) 
 
To	 test	 the	 robustness	 of	 the	 results	 with	 respect	 to	 our	 forecasting	 analysis,	 we	 report,	 as	 a	
primary	analysis,	the	results	obtained	using	observations	up	to	2007,	where	only	two	waves	of	the	
World	Value	Survey	and	the	European	Value	Survey	are	included.	As	reported	later,	the	results	are	
qualitatively	the	same	with	either	the	larger	or	the	shorter	version	of	the	dataset.	
	
We	also	decided	that,	given	the	strong	negative	correlation	between	tax	morale	and	the	level	of	
perceived	 corruption,	 we	 would	 also	 use	 the	 countries’	 values	 of	 corruption	 taken	 by	 the	
Transparency	International	Survey	as	a	dependent	variable.	
	
8.2.	Results		
	
We	provide	our	econometric	analysis	by	using	a	Fixed	Effect	(FE)	liner	panel	data	model,	where	the	
coefficients	are	estimated	using	Within-the-Group	(WG)	point	estimates.	As	far	as	the	magnitude	
of	 the	coefficients	 is	 concerned,	all	 variable	have	been	standardized	 to	make	 them	comparable.	
Finally,	to	make	the	results	more	readable,	all	variables	have	been	reversed	(multiplied	by	-1).	So	
that,	 for	 all	 variables,	 the	numerical	 values	 are	 in	 line	with	 the	meaning	of	 the	 variable;	hence,	
their	values	increase	with	the	intensity	of	the	variable.	
	
In	Table	7,	we	summarize	the	signs	of	our	expected	and	estimated	results.	As	shown,	we	assume	a	
strong	 positive	 correlation	 between	 family	 ties	 and	 the	 shadow	 economy	 (ue),	 while	 we	 also	
assume	that	an	increase	in	the	level	of	interest	in	politics,	trust,	and	religiosity	should	reduce	the	
size	of	the	ue.	As	expected,	we	found	a	negative	impact	of	the	interest	of	politics	and	trust	on	ue,	
and	 a	 positive	 effect	 of	 family	 ties	 on	 ue.	 In	 contrast	 to	 the	 mainstream	 literature,	 we,	
unexpectedly,	 observed	 a	 positive	 correlation	 between	 religiosity	 and	 the	 level	 of	 the	 shadow	
economy.24	
	
Moreover,	 in	Table	7,	we	report	also	the	expected	relationship	between	our	main	variables	and	
tax	morale.	 As	 expected	we	 find	 a	 negative	 impact	 of	 family	 ties	 on	 tax	morale,	 and	 a	 positive	
effect	of	trust	on	tax	morale.	The	results	for	politics	and	religion	are	ambiguous.	In	conclusion,	we	
                                                
24In	a	work	in	progress	(Marè-Porcelli,	2014),	we	are	aiming	to	estimate	the	possible	effects	of	religiosity	on	trust,	tax	
morale,	and	the	underground	economy	and	the	main	determinants	of	the	intensity	of	religion	that	negatively	impact	
tax	morale	and	the	degree	of	trust.		
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also	report	the	expected	correlation	between	our	main	variables	and	corruption.	As	expected,	we	
find	that	family	ties	have	a	positive	impact	on	corruption,	while	trust	and	religion	show	a	negative	
impact	on	corruption.	In	contrast,	the	importance	of	politics	presents	an	ambiguous	effect.	
	
Table	8	presents	the	point	estimates	of	the	coefficients	of	the	model	 in	equation	(1),	where	the	
level	of	family	ties	is	measured	by	using	the	principal	component	of	the	variables	help	child,	love	
parents,	and	the	importance	of	the	family.	In	particular,	with	all	of	the	specifications,	we	observe	
that,	the	level	of	the	shadow	economy	is	high	when	family	ties	are	strong.	The	magnitude	and	the	
statistical	 significance	of	 the	coefficient	 remain	always	high;	however,	 it	becomes	weaker	as	we	
increase	the	number	of	control	variables.	As	a	robustness	check,	we	compute	the	same	estimates	
in	Table	9,	by	using	the	forecasted	values	up	to	2010,	and	we	obtained	similar	results.25	
	
In	Table	10,	we	present	the	panel	regression	of	family	ties	on	tax	morale	as	a	check	of	robustness.	
In	column	(1),	where	we	perform	a	simple	OLS	without	country	and	year-fixed	effect,	we	observe	a	
strong	positive	relationship	between	family	ties	and	tax	morale.	However,	when	we	introduce	the	
country-fixed	 effect,	 the	 sign	 of	 the	 coefficient	 become	 negative,	 in	 line	 with	 the	 mainstream	
literature.	This	result	indicates	that	“strong	family	ties	imply	weak	tax	morale,”	although	we	only	
obtained	statistically	significant	results	in	column	(6),	where	we	control	for	the	level	of	trust.		
	
Our	results	stress	two	crucial	points:	the	first,	as	highlighted	by	Bertand	and	Schoar	(2006),	there	
is	 a	 strong	 negative	 correlation	 between	 trust	 and	 family	 ties;26	second,	 we	 believe	 that	 these	
coefficients	are	upward	biased	because	of	 the	problem	of	 reverse	causality	between	 family	 ties	
and	tax	morale.	To	address	this	last	issue	(as	discussed	in	more	detail	in	the	next	paragraph),	we	
performed	 an	 IV	 analysis,	which	 showed	 that	 the	 impact	 of	 family	 ties	 on	 tax	morale	 is	 indeed	
negative	and	significant.	
	
As	 a	 further	 robustness	 check,	 in	 Table	 11	 we	 present	 the	 panel	 regression	 of	 family	 ties	 on	
corruption,	 as	 defined	 in	 the	previous	paragraph.27	In	 all	 specifications,	we	obtain	 the	 expected	
positive	sign	for	the	relationship	between	family	ties	and	corruption;	in	other	words,	when	family	
ties	are	stronger,	the	perceived	level	of	corruption	is	higher.	However,	as	before,	we	address	the	
issue	of	reverse	causality	by	performing	an	IV	analysis	(which	is	discussed	in	the	next	paragraph),	
which	shows	that	the	OLS	estimate	might	be	downward	biased,	since	the	IV	regression	reports	a	
much	stronger	positive	impact	of	family	ties	on	corruption28.	
	
8.3.	IV	analysis	between	family	ties	and	the	underground	economy	
	
To	interpret	the	positive	correlation	obtained	between	family	ties	and	the	underground	economy,	
in	terms	of	a	causal	relationship,	we	perform	an	instrumental	variables	exercise	using	the	variables	
role	 of	 the	mother	and	 role	 of	 the	 father,	 as	 registered	 in	 the	 1981	 European	 Value	 Survey,	 as	
instruments	 for	 the	variables	 love	parents,	help	child,	and	 importance	of	 family.	 These	variables	
                                                
25In	another	specification,	where	we	use	the	variables	love	parents	and	help	child	individually,	as	a	measure	of	family	
ties,	their	impact	on	the	degree	of	the	shadow	economy	remains	positive	and	statistically	very	significant.	
26In	fact,	in	columns	(6)	of	Table	10,	where	we	also	used	controls	for	trust,	the	impact	of	family	ties	on	tax	morale	is	
negative	and	statistically	significant.	
27The	number	of	countries	for	which	we	perform	this	estimate	is	slightly	lower	compared	to	those	for	which	we	have	
data	on	family	ties	and	the	underground	economy,	since	we	could	not	use	data	related	to	the	1990	wave	due	to	the	
absence	of	CPI	data.		
28See	also	Schneider	and	Buhen	(2012),	where	the	possible	effect	of	corruption	on	tax	morale	is	analyzed.	
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are	 only	 available	 for	 14	 countries	 in	 our	 sample,29	and	 are	 time	 invariant,	 because	 the	 related	
questions	were	not	replicated	in	more	recent	versions	of	the	European	Value	Survey.		
	
As	preliminary	evidence	for	the	validity	of	our	 instrumental	variables	exercise,	we	performed	an	
estimate	of	 the	effect	of	 the	 role	of	 the	mother	 and	of	 the	 role	of	 the	 father	on	 family	 ties.	 In	
particular,	Table	12	 (which,	 in	column	6,	presents	a	 first-stage	 regression)	 shows	 that	both	“the	
role	of	the	mother”	and	“the	role	of	the	father”	exhibit	a	huge	impact	on	our	measures	of	family	
ties.	Specifically,	the	mother	is	positively	correlated	with	family	ties,	while	the	father	is	negatively	
correlated.30	
	
Table	13	compares	the	results	of	the	OLS	and	IV	regressions	of	the	shadow	economy	over	family	
ties	using	the	“role	of	the	mother”	and	the	“role	of	the	father”	as	instruments	for	family	ties.	First,	
the	 positive	 impact	 of	 family	 ties	 on	 the	 level	 of	 the	 underground	 economy	 is	 confirmed.	
Moreover,	 we	 cannot	 reject	 the	 null	 hypothesis	 that	 family	 ties	 are	 exogenous.	 Therefore,	 we	
provide	 some	 evidence	 for	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 causal	 relationship	 between	 family	 ties	 and	 the	
dimension	of	the	underground	economy.	
	
8.4.	IV	analysis	between	family	ties	and	tax	morale	
	
Table	14	compares	the	results	of	the	OLS	and	IV	regressions	of	tax	morale	over	family	ties	using	
the	“role	of	the	mother”	and	the	“role	of	the	father”	as	an	instrument	for	family	ties.	In	this	case,	
we	reject	the	null	hypothesis	that	our	measure	of	family	ties	is	exogenous.	Our	IV	analysis	shows	
that	the	OLS	estimates	of	the	impact	of	family	ties	on	tax	morale	are	upward	biased.	In	fact,	the	
magnitude	 of	 the	 coefficient	 ranges	 from	 -0.5045	 to	 -3.0906,	 and	 remains	 highly	 statistically	
significant.	As	a	result,	 it	 is	possible	to	conclude	that	there	 is	also	robust	evidence	of	a	negative	
relationship	between	the	intensity	of	family	ties	and	the	level	of	tax	morale.		
	
8.5.	IV	analysis	between	family	ties	and	corruption		
	
Table	15	compares	the	results	of	the	OLS	and	IV	regressions	of	corruption	over	family	ties	using	
the	“role	of	the	mother”	and	the	“role	of	the	father”	as	an	instrument	for	family	ties.	In	this	case,	
we	also	reject	the	null	hypothesis	that	our	measure	of	family	ties	is	exogenous	(as	for	tax	morale).	
Our	IV	analysis	shows	that	the	OLS	estimates	of	the	impact	of	family	ties	on	the	level	of	corruption	
were	downward	biased.	 In	 fact,	 the	magnitude	of	 the	coefficient	 ranges	 from	0.3164	 to	1.7365,	
and	remains	highly	statistically	significant.	As	a	result,	we	can	conclude	that	 there	 is	also	robust	
evidence	of	a	positive	relationship	between	the	intensity	of	family	ties	and	the	level	of	perceived	
corruption.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
                                                
29Malta,	Belgium,	Italy,	Ireland,	Great	Britain,	Iceland,	United	States,	Denmark,	France,	Canada,	Netherlands,	Germany.	
30	It	is	not	clear	how	this	familial	pattern	may	be	explained.	Is	the	intensity	of	family	ties	a	product	of	an	excessive	role	
of	the	mother,	or	is	it	due	to	the	absence	of	the	father?	We	may	suppose,	in	certain	circumstances,	at	least	in	current	
modern	society,	a	joint	and	opposite	effect	of	these	characteristics,	even	if	the	role	of	the	mother	tends	to	supersede		
that	of	the	father.		
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9.	Conclusions	and	policy	implications	
	
This	paper	provides	the	first	empirical	evidence	supporting	the	argument	that	family	ties	are	one	
of	the	most	important	determinants	of	the	underground	economy,	tax	morale,	and	corruption.	
	
To	explain	the	level	of	the	shadow	economy,	one	must	consider	both	classical	fiscal	variables	(such	
as	 tax	 burden,	 tax	 rates,	 detection	 policy,	 and	 other	 elements	 that	 affect	 compliance)	 and	
subjective	values	(such	as	the	power	of	the	family,	tax	morale,	and	the	degree	of	trust).	
	
The	main	policy	 implications	of	our	results	 is	 that	the	structure	of	society	represents	one	of	 the	
key	factors	that	should	be	taken	into	account	when	designing	policies	aimed	to	reduce	tax	evasion.	
We	believe	 that,	 away	 from	any	 value	 judgment,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 assume	 the	 correct	 balance	
between	trust	in	the	family	and	trust	in	public	institutions.	Moral	values	are	made	of	and	shaped	
by	the	quality	of	public	institutions	and	the	intensity	of	family	ties.	These	values	largely	affect	tax	
morale,	the	size	of	the	underground	economy,	and	corruption.		
	
In	conclusion,	our	analysis	shows	that	different	types	of	family	structures	(nuclear,	atomistic,	etc.)	
are	 very	 important,	 and	 tend	 to	 have	 evident	 economic,	 moral,	 and	 social	 implications.	 The	
general	 intermediate	 structure	 of	 a	 society	 is	 weakened	when	 the	 family	 is	 the	 only	 source	 of	
personal	relations	and	trust.	This	phenomenon	negatively	affects	political	and	civic	involvements,	
and	 hence	 tax	 morale,	 which	 in	 turns	 produces	 a	 higher	 level	 of	 underground	 economy	 and	
corruption	that	ultimately	worsen	the	quality	of	institutions.	
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Appendix	–	Tables	and	Figures	
 
Table 1.Description, source, and availability of variables 
Variable Description Source Availability 
Dependent variables (Shadow economy, tax morale, corruption) 
ue Shadow economy (% of GDP) Schneider et al. (2000, 2002, 2005, 2010) 1990-2007 
cpiindex Corruption Perception Index (1=high corruption, 10=low corruption) 
Transparency 
International 1995-2010 
tax_morale Principal component among “claiming”, “cheating,” “bribe,” and “transport” 
World Value Survey;  
European Value Survey 1990-2010 
claiming “do you justify: claiming state benefits” (1=never, 10=always) 
cheating “do you justify: cheating on tax” (1=never, 10=always) 
bribe “do you justify: accepting a bribe” (1=never, 10=always) 
transport “do you justify: avoiding fare on public transport” (1=never, 10=always) 
Family ties 
fties_pca Principal component among “family,” “loveparents”, and “helpchild” 
World Value Survey; 
European Value Survey 1990-2010 
family “how important is family in your life” (1=very important, 4=not at all important) 
love parents “love and respect parents” (1=agree, 2=disagree) 
help child “parents should sacrifice own wellbeing for their children” (1=agree, 2=disagree) 
role_mother “relationship between you and your mother” (1=very close, 3=not very close) European Value Survey 1981 
role_father “relationship between you and your father” (1=very close, 3=not very close)  
Control variables 
Fiscal 
Cash receipts from taxes, social contributions, 
and other revenues such as fines, fees, rent, 
and income from property or sales (% of 
GDP) 
World Bank, revenue 
data 
1990-2010 
Religion “how important is religion in your life” (1=very important, 4=not at all important) 
World Value Survey; 
European Value Survey 
religiouspersonv114 “are you a religious person” (1=religious person, 3=convinced atheist) 
Trustcc “how much confidence do you have in church” (1=a great deal, 4=none at all) 
trustpeoplev62 “people can be trusted” (1=agree, 2=disagree) 
trustparliav211x “how much confidence you have in the parliament” (1=a great deal, 4=none at all) 
Imppolitics “how important is politics in your life” (1=very important, 4=not at all important) 
lr political view: left-right (1=left, 10=right) 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics  
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs 
Dependent variables (Shadow economy, tax morale, corruption) 
ue 29.22 14.38 6.60 72.50 623 
cpiindex 5.35 2.31 1.50 10.00 610 
tax_morale 0.07 1.01 -2.04 5.12 711 
claiming 1.99 0.53 1.18 4.78 718 
cheating 1.97 0.44 1.00 4.08 718 
bribe 1.56 0.35 1.02 3.36 728 
transport 2.04 0.47 1.09 4.46 711 
Family ties 
fties_pca -0.03 0.95 -1.79 2.47 693 
family 1.14 0.09 1.01 1.47 730 
love parents 1.23 0.16 1.03 1.72 693 
help child 1.35 0.18 1.03 1.80 693 
role_mother 1.57 0.11 1.39 1.77 197 
role_father 1.79 0.13 1.46 1.97 197 
Control variables 
fiscal 26.47 9.87 7.48 78.47 1029 
religionx 2.11 0.60 1.02 3.19 730 
religiouspersonv114 1.32 0.20 1.01 2.01 716 
trustcc 2.16 0.47 1.12 2.97 705 
trustpeoplev62 1.70 0.16 1.24 1.96 746 
trustparliav211x 2.69 0.34 1.65 3.50 701 
imppolitics 2.73 0.26 2.00 3.25 730 
lr 5.57 0.52 3.59 7.56 717 
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Table 3.Countries for each wave (stars identify outlier countries excluded from the 
regressions) 
Wave 1990 Wave 2000 Wave 2008 
Argentina Albania Morocco Albania Korea (South) 
Austria Algeria Netherlands** Andorra Latvia 
Belarus* Argentina Nigeria Argentina Lithuania*** 
Belgium Austria Pakistan Armenia Luxembourg 
Brazil Bangladesh Peru Australia*** Macedonia 
Bulgaria Belarus* Philippines Austria Malaysia 
Canada Belgium Poland Azerbaijan Mali 
Chile Bosnia Herzeg. Portugal Belarus* Malta 
China* Bulgaria Puerto Rico Belgium Mexico 
Czech Republic* Canada Romania Bosnia Herzeg Moldova 
Denmark Chile Russian Federation Brazil*** Morocco 
Estonia China* Saudi Arabia Bulgaria Netherlands 
Finland Croatia  Singapore Burkina Faso New Zealand 
France Czech Republic* Slovak Republic Canada Norway 
Germany* Denmark Slovenia Chile Peru 
Great Britain Egypt South Africa China* Poland*** 
Hungary Estonia Spain Colombia Portugal 
Iceland Finland Sweden Croatia  Romania*** 
India France Tanzania Czech Republic* Russian Federation 
Ireland Germany* Turkey Denmark Rwanda 
Italy Great Britain Uganda Egypt Slovak Republic 
Japan Greece Ukraine Estonia Slovenia 
Korea (South) Hungary United States Ethiopia South Africa 
Latvia Iceland Venezuela Finland Spain 
Lithuania India Viet Nam France Sweden 
Malta Indonesia Zimbabwe Georgia Switzerland 
Mexico Iran 
 
Germany* Taiwan 
Netherlands Iraq 
 
Ghana Thailand 
Nigeria Ireland 
 
Great Britain Trinidad and Tobago 
Norway Israel 
 
Greece*** Turkey 
Poland Italy 
 
Guatemala Ukraine*** 
Portugal Japan  Hong Kong United States 
Romania Jordan  Hungary Uruguay 
Russian Federation Korea (South)  Iceland*** Viet Nam 
Slovak Republic Kyrgyzstan  India Zambia 
Slovenia Latvia**  Indonesia  
South Africa Lithuania  Iran  
Spain Luxembourg  Iraq  
Sweden Macedonia  Ireland  
Switzerland Malta  Italy  
Turkey Mexico  Japan  
United States Moldova  Jordan  
* = General outliers;    ** = Shadow economy outliers;    *** = Tax morale outliers. 
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Table 4a.Family ties variables, correlation matrix (country means, all waves). 
  family - “how important 
is family in your life” 
(1=very important, 
4=not at all important) 
loveparents - “love 
and respect parents” 
(1=agree, 2=disagree) 
helpchild - “parents should 
sacrifice own wellbeing for 
their children” (1=agree, 
2=disagree) 
family - “how important is 
family in your life” (1=very 
important, 4=not at all 
important) 
1     
loveparents - “love and 
respect parents” (1=agree, 
2=disagree) 
0.3154 1   
p-value = (0.000)     
helpchild - “parents should 
sacrifice own wellbeing for 
their children” (1=agree, 
2=disagree) 
0.5024 0.4610 1 
p-value = (0.000) p-value = (0.000)   
 
Table 4b.Tax morale variables, correlation matrix (country means, all waves). 
  claiming - “do 
you justify: 
claiming state 
benefits” 
(1=never, 
10=always) 
cheating - “do 
you justify: 
cheating on tax” 
(1=never, 
10=always) 
bribe - “do you 
justify: accepting a 
bribe” (1=never, 
10=always) 
transport - “do you 
justify: avoiding fare on 
public transport” 
(1=never, 10=always) 
claiming - “do you 
justify: claiming 
state benefits” 
(1=never, 
10=always) 
1       
cheating - “do you 
justify: cheating on 
tax” (1=never, 
10=always) 
0.539 1     
p-value = (0.000)       
bribe - “do you 
justify: accepting a 
bribe” (1=never, 
10=always) 
0.5831 0.6348 1   
p-value = (0.000) p-value = (0.000)    
transport - “do you 
justify: avoiding fare 
on public transport” 
(1=never, 
10=always) 
0.653 0.6929 0.7034 1 
p-value = (0.000) p-value = (0.000) p-value = (0.000) 
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Table 5 Factor analysis of tax morale 
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Table 6 Factor analysis of family ties 
!
Tuesday, 2 April 2013 09:32   Page 1
User: Francesco Porcelli   
1 . factor family helpchild loveparents, pcf
(obs=1235)
Factor analysis/correlation                        Number of obs    =     1235
    Method: principal-component factors            Retained factors =        1
    Rotation: (unrotated)                          Number of params =        3
    
         Factor     Eigenvalue   Difference        Proportion   Cumulative
    
        Factor1        1.85723      1.17057            0.6191       0.6191
        Factor2        0.68665      0.23054            0.2289       0.8480
        Factor3        0.45612            .            0.1520       1.0000
    
    LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(3)  =  668.18 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances
    
        Variable   Factor1    Uniqueness 
    
          family    0.7690       0.4086  
       helpchild    0.8482       0.2805  
     loveparents    0.7391       0.4537  
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Table 7 
Expected(and(es,mated(results(
Family(,es( Poli,cs( Trust( Religion(
Shadow'
Economy(
+' .' .' .'
YES' YES' YES' NO'
Family(,es( Poli,cs( Trust( Religion(
Tax'morale(
'
.' +' +' .'
YES' ?' YES' ?'
Family(,es( Poli,cs( Trust( Religion(
Corrup;on( +' .' .' .'
YES' ?' YES' YES'
27'
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Table 8 FE Panel data model (WG estimator) point estimates of the impact of family 
ties on the shadow economy. All variables are standardized and their values 
increase with the intensity of the variable, years 1990–2007. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
pc - family ties 0.2639*** 0.0788*** 0.0407*** 0.0368*** 0.0411*** 0.0409*** 0.0312* 0.0287* 
  (0.0358) (0.0149) (0.0121) (0.0131) (0.0131) (0.0144) (0.0161) (0.0148) 
Revenue from taxes,       0.0560* 0.0593* 0.0603* 0.0589* 0.0608* 
social contributions, and other revenues       (0.0304) (0.0324) (0.0326) (0.0312) (0.0332) 
Religion             0.0212 0.0766* 
              (0.0354) (0.0446) 
Religious person             0.0391 0.0487* 
              (0.0258) (0.0260) 
Trust people           0.0105   0.0137 
            (0.0100)   (0.0095) 
Trust parliament          0.0071   0.0074 
           (0.0112)   (0.0130) 
Trust church           0.0003   -0.0673** 
            (0.0237)   (0.0258) 
Importance of politics         0.0091     -0.0055 
          (0.0120)     (0.0112) 
Political orientation (from right to left)         0.0075     0.0115 
          (0.0078)     (0.0099) 
Country FE NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Estimator OLS WG WG WG WG WG WG WG 
Observations 480 480 480 480 451 454 472 446 
Number countries   61 61 61 58 58 60 57 
R-squared 0.0901 0.0523 0.5737 0.5967 0.5967 0.5988 0.5981 0.6005 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 9 FE Panel data model (WG estimator) point estimates of the impact of family 
ties on shadow economy. All variables are standardized and their values increase 
with the intensity of the variable, years 1990–2010. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
pc - family ties 0.3080*** 0.0886*** 0.0267** 0.0242* 0.0286** 0.0184 0.0024 -0.0037 
  (0.0342) (0.0254) (0.0132) (0.0123) (0.0122) (0.0119) (0.0159) (0.0169) 
Revenue from taxes,       0.0577** 0.0550* 0.0586* 0.0594** 0.0560* 
social contributions, and other revenues       (0.0288) (0.0301) (0.0300) (0.0274) (0.0292) 
Religion             0.014 0.0959* 
              (0.0376) (0.0523) 
Religious person             0.0930*** 0.0980*** 
              (0.0307) (0.0280) 
Trust people           -0.0053   0.0065 
            (0.0110)   (0.0093) 
Trust parliament          0.0072   0.0042 
           (0.0117)   (0.0115) 
Trust church           0.0324   -0.0563* 
            (0.0297)   (0.0335) 
Importance of politics         -0.0282**     -0.0351** 
          (0.0136)     (0.0146) 
Political orientation (from right to left)         0.0126     0.0096 
          (0.0100)     (0.0105) 
Country FE NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Estimator OLS WG WG WG WG WG WG WG 
Observations 615 615 615 615 583 584 604 576 
Number countries   64 64 64 63 62 63 62 
R-squared 0.1068 0.0722 0.6445 0.6626 0.6742 0.6688 0.686 0.7011 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 10 FE Panel data model (WG estimator) point estimates of the impact of 
family ties on tax morale (principal component). All variables are standardized and 
their values increase with the intensity of the variable. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
pc - family ties 0.1370*** -0.2027 -0.2763 -0.2796 -0.2225 -0.3672* -0.4027 -0.2448 
  (0.0398) (0.1978) (0.1947) (0.1996) (0.2053) (0.1901) (0.2646) (0.2235) 
Revenue from taxes,       0.0424 0.0225 0.1041 0.1689 0.1682 
social contributions, and other revenues       (0.1878) (0.1917) (0.1747) (0.1737) (0.1589) 
Religion             0.1135 -0.45 
              (0.5580) (0.8835) 
Religious person             0.4052 0.4025 
              (0.4446) (0.6164) 
Trust people           0.2165   0.2641* 
            (0.1428)   (0.1332) 
Trust parliament          -0.0638   -0.226 
           (0.1586)   (0.1374) 
Trust church           0.4612**   0.4416 
            (0.2179)   (0.3166) 
Importance of politics         -0.1516     -0.1979 
          (0.1657)     (0.1677) 
Political orientation (from right to left)         0.3028     0.1746 
          (0.1887)     (0.2400) 
Country FE NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Estimator OLS WG WG WG WG WG WG WG 
Observations 669 669 669 669 628 638 649 612 
Number countries   64 64 64 63 62 63 62 
R-squared 0.0187 0.0111 0.1575 0.1577 0.198 0.2163 0.1796 0.2575 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 11 FE Panel data model (WG estimator) point estimates of the impact of 
family ties on corruption (CPI). All variables are standardized and their values 
increase with the intensity of the variable. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
pc - family ties 0.4362*** 0.0397 0.0534 0.0567 0.037 0.0832* 0.0951 0.0822 
  (0.0391) (0.0407) (0.0446) (0.0455) (0.0433) (0.0439) (0.0591) (0.0644) 
Revenue from taxes,       -0.0565 -0.0353 -0.0553 -0.0537 -0.0415 
social contributions, and other revenues       (0.0618) (0.0591) (0.0600) (0.0591) (0.0581) 
Religion             0.2308 0.2163 
              (0.2295) (0.2440) 
Religious person             -0.3576*** -0.2708* 
              (0.1172) (0.1480) 
Trust people           -0.0015   0.0142 
            (0.0524)   (0.0501) 
Trust parliament          -0.0783*   -0.0555 
           (0.0437)   (0.0425) 
Trust church           -0.1406*   -0.0479 
            (0.0761)   (0.0937) 
Importance of politics         0.0730*     0.0239 
          (0.0432)     (0.0541) 
Political orientation (from right to left)         -0.0401     -0.0358 
          (0.0602)     (0.0548) 
Country FE NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Estimator OLS WG WG WG WG WG WG WG 
Observations 462 462 462 462 456 457 462 451 
Number countries   55 55 55 55 54 55 54 
R-squared 0.1732 0.0034 0.0556 0.0597 0.1022 0.0767 0.106 0.1281 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 12 OLS point estimates of the impact of the role of the mother and the role of 
the father on family ties, first stage regression. All variables are standardized and 
their values increase with the intensity of the variable. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Importance of the role of the mother 0.4481** 0.3323*** 0.2386 0.3191*** 0.3611*** 0.2383*** 
  (0.1737) (0.1262) (0.1516) (0.0805) (0.0867)  (0.0652) 
Importance of the role of the father -0.3517* 0.2764** -0.4465*** -0.3616*** -0.4544*** -0.2467*** 
  (0.1795) (0.1337) (0.1192) (0.0752) (0.1544)  (0.0775) 
Revenue from taxes,   -0.8565***       -0.265*** 
social contributions, and other revenues   (0.1098)        (0.0838) 
Religion     1.4592***     0.6537*** 
      (0.0819)      (0.1179) 
Religious person     -0.6402***     -0.7564*** 
      (0.0803)      (0.0742) 
Trust people       0.6769***   0.2019*** 
        (0.0309)    (0.0584) 
Trust parliament       -0.9040***  -0.1886*** 
        (0.0905)   (0.0565) 
Trust church       0.5542***   0.7025*** 
        (0.0439)    (0.089) 
Importance of politics         -0.6696*** -0.4755*** 
          (0.0592)  (0.0532) 
Political orientation (from right to left)         0.9174*** 0.0853 
          (0.1615)  (0.1593) 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Observations 119 119 119 119 119 119 
Number countries 14 14 14 14 14 14 
F( 18, 100) =           553.44 
R-squared 0.1018 0.4409 0.5752 0.8213 0.6301 0.9552 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 13 OLS and 2SLS point estimates of the impact of family ties on the shadow economy 
using the variable role of the mother and role of the father as instruments for family ties. 
All variables are standardized and their values increase with the intensity of the variable. 
  (1) (2) 
pc - family ties 0.3881*** 0.6889*** 
  (0.0742) (0.2404) 
Year FE YES YES 
Control variables YES YES 
Estimator OLS 2SLS 
Observations 119 119 
Number countries 14 14 
Ho: Family ties are exogenous, F(1, 100)   (p = 0.1683) 
R-squared 0.8068   
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
Table 14 OLS and 2SLS point estimates of the impact of family ties on tax morale using the 
variable role of the mother and role of the father as instruments for family ties. All 
variables are standardized and their values increase with the intensity of the variable. 
  (1) (2) 
pc - family ties -0.5045*** -3.0906*** 
  (0.1334) (0.7956) 
Year FE YES YES 
Control variables YES YES 
Estimator OLS 2SLS 
Observations 119 119 
Number countries 14 14 
Ho: Family ties are exogenous, F(1, 99)    (p = 0.0000) 
R-squared 0.8075   
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
Table 15 OLS and 2SLS point estimates of the impact of family ties on corruption using the 
variable role of the mother and role of the father as instruments for family ties. All 
variables are standardized and their values increase with the intensity of the variable. 
  (1) (2) 
pc - family ties 0.3164*** 1.7365*** 
  (0.1022) (0.5253) 
Year FE YES YES 
Control variables YES YES 
Estimator OLS 2SLS 
Observations 119 119 
Number countries 14 14 
Ho: Family ties are exogenous, F(1, 99)    (p = 0.0000) 
R-squared 0.8729   
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Figure 1 Panel structure 
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Figure 2 Variable love parents (original measure of scale, 1 = high family ties), 
average 1990–2010. 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Variable help child (original measure of scale, 1 = high family ties), 
average 1990–2010. 
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Figure 4 Variable importance of family (original measure of scale, 1 = high family 
ties), average 1990–2010. 
 
 
 
Figure 5 Variable shadow economy, average 1990–2007. 
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Figure 6 Relationship between love parents and the shadow economy (original 
measure of scale, 1 = high family ties), average 1990–2007. 
 
 
 
Figure 7 Relationship between help child and the shadow economy (original 
measure of scale, 1 = high family ties), average 1990–2007. 
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Figure 8 Relationship between importance of family and the shadow economy 
(original measure of scale, 1 = high family ties), average 1990–2007. 
 
 
 
Figure 9 Relationship among family ties, the role of the mother, and the role of the 
father, average 1990–2010 (values increase with the intensity of the variable). 
 
 
	
 
